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KANSAS v. HENDRICKS: MARKING THE BEGINNING
OF A DANGEROUS NEW ERA IN
CIVIL COMMITMENT
This law reflects confused thinking. ... They make today's mental
health providers and psychiatric hospitals into tomorrow's wardens
and jails.'
INTRODUCTION
The nation gasped in horror over the story of Earl Shriner.2
Shriner was a repeat sex offender, who began his life of violent crimes
at sixteen when he killed a schoolmate.3 After his release from a
mental institution, Shriner then kidnapped and assaulted two teenage
girls.4 While serving his sentence for those crimes, Shriner disclosed
to a cellmate that he wanted a van equipped with cages so that he
could capture, molest, and kill children.5 Eager about his pending re-
lease from prison, Shriner began a diary that carefully outlined his
plans for the torture and murder of children. 6 Although the state
wanted desperately to involuntarily commit Shriner, current laws in
the state did not allow it because he was not mentally ill and had not
recently committed an overt act.7 After the state reluctantly released
Shriner, he committed his most brutal crime on an innocent seven-
year-old boy who was riding his bike near his home in Tacoma, Wash-
ington.8 Shriner kidnapped him, raped him, strangled him, and sev-
ered his penis.9
Recent media attention over heinous crimes by sex offenders such
as Shriner have roused feelings of rage and hatred for sex offenders.
As a result, demands from people nationwide have compelled several
states to enact legislation allowing for involuntary civil commitment of
sexually violent predators, even after they have fully served their
1. Stephen Lally, Steel Beds v. Iron Bars: New Laws Muddle How to Handle Sex Offenders,
WASH. POST, July 27, 1997, at Cl.
2. Barry Siegel, Locking Up Sexual Predators, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at Al.
3. Id. at A30.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Siegel, supra note 2, at Al.
9. Id.
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criminal sentences.' 0 In 1994, Kansas joined those states by enacting
the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVP Act")." While many argue
that such commitment schemes are necessary to protect communities
from these predators,1 2 the constitutionality of these acts is still highly
scrutinized. 13
The most recent constitutional challenge came before the United
States Supreme Court in Kansas v. Hendricks.'4 This Note analyzes
that controversial decision in four parts. Part I discusses the history of
sexual predator laws and summarizes the history of the Kansas stat-
ute. 15 Part II explains in detail the Court's decision in Kansas v. Hen-
dricks.16 Part III analyzes and critiques the justifications advanced by
the Court in its decision to uphold the Kansas SVP Act as it applied to
Leroy Hendricks.17 Finally, Part IV assesses the impact this case will
have on both the legal and mental health communities and on sexual
predators who will be confined under these statutes in the future.' 8
10. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601 to 13-4614 (West Supp. 1997); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE ANN. § 6600-6603 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11.7-101 (Supp. 1997);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-566 (Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(1-9) (West Supp. 1997);
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 205/0.01 (West Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901A (West Supp.
1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West
Supp. 1997); NEE. REV. STAT. § 29-2923 (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.4 et seq. (West
1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-1, 13 (Michie 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.080, .090, .095, .100,
.110, .120 (1995); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 33-6-301 (Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16-1
(Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09 (West Supp. 1997); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 980.01
(West Supp. 1997).
11. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a (West Supp. 1996).
12. See John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of Sex-
ual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1336 (1996) (maintaining that sexual predation is a
noxious problem and sexual predator laws are a constitutional way to protect the public); Na-
thaniel L. Taylor, Abuse of Judicial Review: The Unwarranted Demise of the Sexually Violent
Predators Statute By Young v. Weston, 71 WASH. L. REV. 543, 570 (1996) (emphasizing the ex-
treme need for civil commitment statutes in order to protect communities); Juliet M. Dupuy,
Comment, The Evolution of Wisconsin's Sexual Predator Law, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 873, 892 (1996)
(arguing that sexual predator laws are a very effective way to reduce sexually violent crimes).
13. Robert Marquand, Court Lowers Wall Dividing Church, State ... Elevates Public Safety
Over Predator's Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 24, 1997, at 1, 18; John P. Zanini, Con-
sidering Hendricks v. Kansas for Massachusetts: Can the Commonwealth Constitutionally Detain
Dangerous Persons Who Are Not Mentally Ill?, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
427 (1997) (analyzing the Kansas Supreme Court decision and attempting to predict the outcome
at the Supreme Court level); Sarah H. Francis, Note, Sexually Dangerous Person Statute: Consti-
tutional Protections of Society and the Mentally Ill or Emotionally-Driven Punishment?, 29 SuF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 125 (1995); Editorial, The High Court's Mixed Record. Wrong on Sex Offenders,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1997, at A18; Gina Kolata, The Many Myths About Sex Offenders, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at El0.
14. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Civil Commitment Laws
In the late 1930s, legislatures began enacting "sex psychopath" stat-
utes, which were designed to divert sexually dangerous offenders from
the criminal justice system to the mental health system.19 These of-
fenders were confined until they either fully recovered or were no
longer considered a menace to society.20 By 1960, twenty-six states
and the District of Columbia had enacted their own "sexual psycho-
path" statutes, under which the offenders would be involuntarily com-
mitted and treated after their conviction rather than punished by a
traditional prison sentence.2' By the 1980s, however, pressure from
the growing civil rights movement and concerns over the ability of the
mental health professionals to predict dangerousness and to effec-
tively treat sexual predators prompted many states to repeal their sex-
ual psychopath statutes. 22 By 1990, nearly half of the states had
abolished them.23 While no longer referred to as sexual psychopath
statutes, states have been reviving and enacting new forms, commonly
referred to as sexual predator statutes or sexually dangerous offender
statutes.
B. The United States Supreme Court's Reaction to Civil
Commitment Laws
The legislators of the states that ultimately repealed their sexual
psychopath statutes were not the only people who questioned their
constitutionality. The Supreme Court had been addressing those is-
sues as far back as the 1940s, beginning with Pearson v. Probate
Court.24 In Pearson, the Court upheld Minnesota's psychopathic per-
sonality statute against due process and equal protection challenges
and unanimously rejected that a "habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters," an "utter lack of power to control ... [their] sexual
impulses," and a likelihood "to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss,
pain, or other evil" were unconstitutionally vague and further held
that a state may single out persons for harsher treatment upon a de-
19. Raquel Blacher, Comment, A Historical Perspective of the "Sex Psychopath" Statute: From
the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 897 (1995).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 903.
22. Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator Commitment Sys-
tem: An Unconstitutional Law and An Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105,
109-10 (1990).
23. Id. at 110 n.27.
24. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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termination that they pose a greater risk of danger to the public with-
out violating equal protection principles.2 5 Furthermore, the Court
held that a hearing, right to counsel, and compulsion of witnesses on
the defendant's behalf satisfied the necessary due process
requirements. 26
In 1966, however, the Court struck down a New York statute that
allowed the involuntary psychiatric commitment of prisoners at the
end of their prison terms without jury review, rejecting the contention
that past criminal conduct was sufficient to support continued commit-
ment without further procedures.27 The majority also held that in ad-
dition to jury review, there must be a judicial determination that the
prisoner was dangerously mentally ill.28 This requirement of danger-
ousness was later reiterated in O'Connor v. Donaldson,29 where the
Court determined that a mentally ill individual may not be involunta-
rily committed unless that person is also proven to be dangerous and
unable to live safely in freedom. 30
It was not until 1979, in Addington v. Texas, 31 that the Supreme
Court decided upon the standard of proof required to civilly commit
25. Id. at 274.
26. Id. at 274-77. Applying a rational basis standard, the Court held that the state had consti-
tutionally selected a smaller class of individuals because of their dangerousness and that protec-
tion from those individuals was proper state purpose. Id.
27. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 (1966). The petitioner in this case was certified as
insane by a prison physician while serving his prison sentence. Id. He was then transferred to a
state hospital under the direction of the Department of Corrections. Id. at 107. Upon expiration
of the prisoner's sentence, the prison director filed a petition to have the prisoner transferred to
a civil hospital for civil commitment. Id. The petition was granted, but the prisoner was not
given a judicial hearing normally afforded pursuant to the civil commitment statute. Id. The
Court held that there is no difference between a person nearing the end of a penal term and a
person who is not currently imprisoned; therefore, the prisoner is entitled to the same judicial
review afforded to persons uider the civil commitment statute. Id.
28. Id. at 110. The Baxstrom Court did not explicitly define criteria that must be proven
before a defendant is considered dangerously mentally ill, implying that the decision is made by
a judge based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 112-13.
29. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The petitioner had been confined for almost fifteen years in a state
mental hospital. Id at 564. He brought an action for damages, alleging that the hospital's super-
intendent had maliciously deprived him of his right to liberty because he was not mentally ill or
dangerous to himself or others. Id. at 565. In the alternative, the petitioner argued that if he was
mentally ill, then he was deprived of his constitutional right to treatment. Id. at 563.
30. Id. at 575. The Court did not set forth standards under which a state may confine a men-
tally ill person, noting it was beyond the scope of the decision. Id. at 573. Instead, the Court
held that a finding of mental illness alone is not a sufficient basis for civil commitment and that
the state, therefore, needed to show that petitioner was dangerous to himself or others. Id. at
575. Because that had not been shown, the petitioner was deprived of his right to liberty. Id.
The Court majority did not, however, address the petitioner's argument that he had a constitu-
tional right to treatment, but the concurrence stated that a person does not have an absolute
constitutional right to treatment. Id. at 581.
31. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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an individual for an indefinite period of time in a state hospital. 32 In
deciding the issue, the Court assessed both the individual's interest in
not being confined indefinitely and the state's interest in committing
the emotionally disturbed. 33 Meanwhile, the Court was mindful "that
the function of the legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous
decisions. '34 The Court placed great weight on the "adverse social
consequences to the individual" and the "very significant impact...
[that confinement to a mental hospital has] .. .on the individual. 35
Ultimately, the Court held that a state must at least show clear and
convincing evidence to civilly commit an individual but added that the
state would be free to require a greater showing.36
In Vitek v. Jones,37 the Court placed more procedural requirements
on the state, announcing that "[n]one of our decisions holds that con-
viction for a crime entitles a State not only to confine the convicted
person but also to determine that he has a mental illness and to sub-
ject him involuntarily to institutional care in a mental hospital. '38 A
mere finding by the prison psychologist or physician that a mental ill-
ness existed was, therefore, insufficient to involuntarily transfer a
prisoner from prison to a mental hospital for treatment.39 Instead, the
prisoner was entitled to procedural safeguards such as notice, an ad-
versary hearing, and counsel to contest the transfer decision.40
The Supreme Court's practice of granting civilly committed individ-
uals more constitutional rights was cut short in Allen v. Illinois,41 when
the Court ruled that civil commitment procedures were not criminal
within the context of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution and that due process did not require an independent applica-
32. Id. at 419-20.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 425.
35. Id. at 425-26.
36. Id. at 433.
37. 445 U.S. 480 (1980). The appellee was a convicted felon who was transferred from a state
prison to a mental hospital pursuant to a state statute that allowed for such a transfer based upon
the opinion of the prison psychologist. Id. at 480. The appellee filed an action, alleging that
absence of adequate notice and judicial review constituted a deprivation of his due process
rights. Id.
38. Id. at 493.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 483.
41. 478 U.S. 364 (1986). The state had filed a petition against the defendant to have him
committed as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to their Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.
Id. at 366. At a bench trial on the petition, the defendant objected to the use of testimony
elicited from him during psychiatric evaluations, alleging a violation of his privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. The objection was overruled, and the decision to civilly commit the defend-
ant was based in part on the testimony given by the psychiatrist. Id.
1998]
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tion of the privilege against self-incrimination. 42 In determining that
the Illinois act was actually civil in nature, the Court emphasized the
following features of the Illinois act: that its language stated that it
"shall be civil in nature," 43 the state's disavowed intent to punish,44
the state's psychological treatment of the individual,45 and that the
system allowed for release after only a brief time in confinement when
provided with a proper showing of full rehabilitation.46 Although this
case's holding was limited to the Fifth Amendment privilege, it was
easily foreseeable that the Court could extend the holding to other
rights normally afforded to criminal defendants.
The last major case to rule on a civil commitment statute before
Hendricks was Foucha v. Louisiana,47 where the Supreme Court held
that an insanity acquittee may be held in a psychiatric facility only as
long as the acquittee is both mentally ill and dangerous. 48 The major-
ity explicitly rejected the rationale that "once ... [the individual]...
committed a criminal act and now has an antisocial personality that
sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a disorder for which there is
no effective treatment, he may be held indefinitely. '49 The Court rea-
soned that accepting such a rationale "would permit the State to hold
indefinitely any other insanity acquittee not mentally ill who could be
shown to have a personality disorder that may lead to criminal con-
duct."'50 The State had not contended that the defendant was mentally
42. Id. at 375.
43. Id. at 368. The Court held that such an expressed statement was an indication of a state's
non-punitive purpose. Id. The Court did acknowledge, however, that a civil label was not dis-
positive and added that the defendant was entitled to show the statute had either a punitive
purpose or effect. Id. at 369 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
44. Id. at 370. The state's disavowed interest in punishment was evidenced by the fact that the
Act did not promote retribution or deterrence but instead treated prisoners. Id. (citing Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). The defendant was committed pursuant to a state law that allowed the
commitment of insanity acquittees to a psychiatric hospital. Id. at 73. According to the proce-
dural requirements of the commitment statutes, after the hospital recommends that the acquittee
be released, a trial court must then hold a hearing to determine dangerousness. Id. If the trial
court finds the defendant to be a danger to himself or others, he or she may be returned to the
hospital even absent a finding of mental illness. Id. The Supreme Court reversed this decision as
a violation of petitioner's due process rights and ruled the state law unconstitutional. Id.
48. Id. at 77.
49. Id. at 82.
50. Id. The Court found it especially troubling that the acquittee was further detained based
upon a psychiatrist's statement that he would not "feel comfortable in certifying that [petitioner]
would not be a danger to himself or to other people," which suggested that the state had not
proven dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 80, 82.
[Vol. 48:113
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ill; therefore, the basis for holding him in a psychiatric facility had
disappeared. 51
As demonstrated by this line of cases, civil commitment statutes
were first enacted to detain mentally ill individuals. Forty years after
the birth of these psychopathic personality statutes, however, the stat-
utes were analogized to another form of civil commitment: pre-trial
detention without bail. In United States v. Salerno,52 the Court upheld
the refusal of bail to offenders who were believed to pose a risk to
society if released.53 Because society was outraged over the crimes of
sexually violent offenders, it pushed for the Bail Reform Act of 198454
to deal with the problem of crimes committed by offenders while out
on bail.55 In its decision to uphold the practice, the Court found that
detention was merely regulatory and that preventing danger is a legiti-
mate regulatory goal. 56
The similarities between the Bail Reform Act and sexual predator
statutes were readily apparent; procedural safeguards such as a hear-
ing, presentation of witnesses and evidence, and right to counsel were
afforded to each defendant. 57 Also, both the Bail Reform Act and
sexual predator statutes require a finding of dangerousness before de-
fendants could be detained, and under these statutes, judicial officers
are not given "unbridled discretion in making the detention determi-
nation.' ' 58 The Court recognized these similarities and partly sup-
ported its decision to uphold the practice by citing Addington: "We
have also held that the government may detain ... individuals who
present a danger to the public."'59 The path that the Court selected in
this case disturbed not only numerous pre-trial detainees but also the
dissent: "The facts set forth ... strongly support the possibility that
the Government is much more interested in litigating a 'test case' than
in resolving an actual controversy ... [and Justice Marshall's dissent-
51. Id. at 78.
52. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
53. Id. at 752.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1341-1356 (West Supp. 1997). Pursuant to the Act, a court now has the discre-
tion to refuse bail to a prisoner who "may flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the
community." Id. § 1342(d)(2). The Court may consider the nature of the offense, the weight of
the evidence against the person, and the history and physical characteristics of the person in
making such a determination. Id. § 1342(g)(1-4).
55. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742.
56. Id. at 747.
57. Id. at 742. See supra notes 26-30, 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing procedural
requirements afforded to defendants in civil commitment schemes).
58. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742. The Court held that these findings of fact must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence. Id.
59. Id. at 748-49 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). See supra notes 31-36 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Addington decision.
1998]
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ing opinion], and not the Court's, is faithful to the 'fundamental prin-
ciples as they have been understood by the traditions of our people
and our law."' 60 As the dissent in Salerno rightfully feared, the occur-
rence of the next analogous situation was only a matter of time.61
C. Resurrection of Civil Commitment for Sexual Predators
As states began to revive their "sexual psychopath" statutes, this
trend gave rise to many constitutional challenges. By the time the
Kansas Supreme Court was called upon to determine the constitution-
ality of its SVP Act, many other courts had already made similar deci-
sions. The most publicized cases arose in Washington, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin.
In Young v. Weston,62 the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Washington ruled that the Sexually Violent Predator statute
was unconstitutional. 63 Young, who was convicted of rape on three
separate occasions during a twenty-two year period, was civilly com-
mitted as a sexual predator under the Washington statute.64 After his
civil commitment trial, the jury found that he was a sexually violent
predator. 65 In his appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, the court
found the statute constitutional and upheld his civil commitment. 66
Young then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and the state
supreme court's decision was reversed by the district court on several
grounds.67 The district court first determined that a finding of an "an-
60. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
46, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
61. The movement toward civil commitment of alcoholics has already begun. See Douglas H.
Olson et al., A Clinical Tool for Rating Response to Civil Commitment for Substance Abuse
Treatment, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1317, 1321 (1997). The objectives of the study were to
assess the patient's response to civil commitment and to identify characteristics associated with a
positive response by the patients to the civil commitment. Id. at 1317. The subjects of Olson's
study were mentally ill alcoholics or patients with both mental and substance abuse disorders.
Id. The researchers maintained that they found a positive response to treatment following civil
commitment. Id. The researchers did admit that the sample size was small and that such com-
mitment is very costly. Id. at 1322.
62. 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995), remanded, 122 F. 3d 38 (1997). This statute, found at
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09, provided the framework for the SVP Act in Kansas. In re Hen-
dricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996).
63. Young, 898 F. Supp. at 753.
64. Id. at 748.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (1993)) (holding that the act was civil in nature and
required proper evidentiary standards in order to satisfy due process concerns).
67. Young, 898 F. Supp. at 752. The court found the statute unconstitutional on three
grounds: violation of the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment;
violation of the ex post facto prohibition in Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution; and viola-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 752-54.
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tisocial personality" was not constitutionally sufficient to justify civil
commitment because it fell short of the mental illness standard estab-
lished in Foucha.68 The court next concluded that the statute was
criminal rather than civil in nature. 69 In support of its finding, the
court noted the potentially indefinite term of the commitment, 70 the
application to already criminal behavior,71 and the implication of ret-
ribution and deterrence.72 The court also cited the apparent lack of
concern for treatment, which is indicative of a "keen interest in pun-
ishment. '73 The court additionally disagreed with the use of "mental
abnormality" as a standard, arguing that the term was not medically
recognizable. 74 The district court granted Young's writ of habeas
corpus.75
The first major case interpreting Minnesota's sexual predator stat-
utes was In re Blodgett.76 The court determined that its predator stat-
ute did not violate substantive due process principles. 77 In his
argument, Blodgett attempted to use Foucha78 to support the proposi-
tion that a state cannot civilly commit an individual absent a finding of
mental illness.79 The court rejected Blodgett's argument, holding that
a finding of a psychopathic personality, as required under the statute,
was a proper subset of mental illness.80
68. Id. at 750. The district court interpreted Foucha as requiring a finding of mental illness in
order to involuntarily civilly commit an individual pursuant to substantive due process protec-
tions. Id. at 750-51. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (holding that mental illness
must be shown by at least clear and convincing evidence); see also supra notes 47-51 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Foucha decision).
69. Young, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 753. The district court was most concerned by the fact that treatment was delayed
until after completion of a prison term. Id. It then stated that the delay not only suggested that
treatment was a secondary concern but that it also was an unconstitutional deprivation of treat-
ment pursuant to state statute. Id.
74. Id. at 750. The district court further disagreed with the state's definition of mental abnor-
mality, suggesting that it was a mere tautology. Id.
75. Young, 898 F. Supp. at 753-54. This decision was remanded, however, in light of the Hen-
dricks decision. Young v. Weston, 122 F.3d 38 (1997).
76. 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994).
77. Id. at 914-15. The version of the statute at issue in both cases may be found at MINN.
STAT. ArNN. § 253B.02 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
78. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text
(discussing the Foucha decision).
79. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914.
80. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
An amended version of the statute was upheld in In re Linehan8'
against substantive due process, equal protection, double jeopardy,
and ex post facto attacks.8 2 The difference between the psychopathic
personality version of the statute as disputed in Blodgett 3 and the sex-
ually dangerous person statute disputed in Linehan is that the sexually
dangerous person statute does not require proof of an inability to con-
trol one's sexual impulses.84 The amended version also describes con-
duct in which the individual must have engaged and conduct in which
the individual is likely to engage. 85
The Minnesota Supreme Court first agreed with the lower court's
finding that "likely" to engage in future sexual conduct was consistent
with a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, thereby satisfying
due process requirements. 86 Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the
court also held that the state has a "compelling interest in protecting
the public from sexual assault" 87 and in "the care and treatment of the
mentally disturbed. '"88 Once the court found that the sexually danger-
ous personality statute was sufficiently narrow in its application, it
held that the statute applied only to those who are "utterly unable to
control impulses to sexually assault others." 89 The court next ad-
dressed the argument that the commitment standards were medically
unsound.90 The court rejected that argument as well, maintaining that
legislatures are allowed flexibility in their definitions and that the sex-
ually dangerous person statute was written under the advice of mental
81. 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996), vacated, In re Linehan, 118 S. Ct. 596 (1997) (vacating judg-
ment in light of the Hendricks decision).
82. Id. at 172. The Minnesota legislature met in special session to amend the civil commit-
ment of psychopathic personalities to include "sexually dangerous persons." MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.02 (1994) (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West Supp. 1997)).
83. 510 N.W.2d 910. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
case.
84. Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 179.
85. Id. A likelihood of future harm is rebuttably presumed for conduct described in criminal
offenses such as criminal sexual conduct in the first through the fourth degrees, murder, man-
slaughter, and kidnapping if those crimes can be shown to have been motivated by sexual im-
pulses. Id. at 179 (citing MINN. STAr. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(a) (1995)). This statute shows a
further erosion of the dangerousness requirement first articulated in Baxstrom. See supra notes
27-28 (requiring that there must be a judicial determination that the prisoner was "dangerously
mentally ill").
86. Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 180.
87. Id. at 181 (citing Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914, 916).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 183.
90. Id. at 184. Linehan tried to argue that the basis for his commitment, antisocial personality
disorder, was not a sufficient justification and was really nothing more than a "definition of
criminal behavior." Id.
[Vol. 48:113
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health professionals. 91 The next issue the court addressed was an
equal protection attack, which it rejected using a heightened scrutiny
standard.92 Relying on Blodgett,93 the court found that the state had a
genuine interest in protecting the public from a group of sufficiently
dangerous individuals. 94 The court rejected ex post facto and double
jeopardy challenges because it determined that the amended statute
was civil in nature. 95 The final issue the court addressed was Line-
han's argument that the evidence was insufficient to justify his invol-
untary civil commitment. 96 The crux of his argument was that a link
had not been established between the "likelihood of sexually harmful
conduct and his past conduct or his personality disorder. ' 97 In re-
jecting that argument, the court looked to the evidence the state
presented in its case and argued that there was clear and convincing
evidence of a likelihood of future harmful conduct. 98
In Wisconsin v. Post,99 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed a
lower court's decision that the Wisconsin Sexually Violent Person
Commitment statute was unconstitutional. 100 In reversing that deci-
sion, the court held that the state had shown a compelling state inter-
est in protecting the public from sexual predators and in treating the
mentally ill and dangerous. 01 The court also found that the statute
was narrowly tailored because it limited commitment only to those
91. Id. at 185.
92. Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 185.
93. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994).
94. Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 186.
95. Id. at 188-89. Again relying on Blodgett, the court held that neither the psychopathic
personality statute nor the sexually dangerous predator statute had punitive effects, as indicated
by the emphasis on treatment and lack of a punitive intent by the legislature. Id. The court
further noted that Linehan had failed to meet his burden of showing that the legislature had a
contrary intent. Id. at 188.
96. Id. at 189.
97. Id. at 190.
98. Id. The evidence noted by the court was a videotape showing Linehan masturbating after
playing with his stepdaughter, which was indicative of his attraction to young girls. Id. The court
further cited his lack of remorse, his rationalization and tendency to lie about his crimes, and his
aggressive actions in treatment. Id. The dissent in Linehan rigorously disagreed with the major-
ity in several respects, first criticizing it for its over-reliance on Blodgett. Id. at 191-92. Addition-
ally, the dissent argued that accepting such a finding of a mental disorder substantially erodes
both due process and the decision in Foucha. Id. at 195. The dissent concluded by emphasizing
that predictions of dangerousness and the finding of a mental disorder do not satisfy due process
requirements. Id. at 196-97. The dissenters further stated that committing a person for some-
thing she or he might do should never be allowed. Id.
99. 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995).
100. Id. at 118. For a version of the statute analyzed by the court, see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980
(West Supp. 1996) (current version at WiS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01 (West Supp. 1997)).
101. Post, 541 N.W.2d at 118.
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who were dangerous and had a mental disorder. 10 2 As Linehan,
Blodgett, and Post demonstrated, the state of civil commitment laws
had not been firmly established when the Court decided Hendricks.
D. The Kansas Reaction
After the story of Earl Shriner and the seven-year-old boy was
broadcast to the public, 10 3 the Washington State Capitol Building was
bombarded with letters, calls, and protest marches demanding tougher
laws for sex offenders.10 4 Washington soon became the first state to
enact the modern version of the sexual psychopath statutes. 105 Kansas
responded similarly to public pressure after the rape and murder of
Stephanie Schmidt by co-worker Donald Ray Gideon, a man who had
been recently released from prison for a previous rape. 0 6 An ad hoc
task force formed by the victim's family pushed for passage of the
SVP Act and won, 10 7 making Kansas one of eight states actively en-
forcing sexual predator statutes.' 08
The SVP Act, which is similar to the act passed in Washington, pro-
vides for the civil commitment of persons who, according to the legis-
lative findings, comprise a "small but extremely dangerous group...
102. Id. at 122-24. The court dispelled with an analysis of the distinction between mental
illness and mental disorder, noting that even the Supreme Court had not articulated a single
definition sufficient for civil commitment. Id.
103. Siegel, supra note 2, at Al,.
104. See id. at A30. As a public display of their outrage over the crimes committed by Earl
Shriner, groups called the "Friends of Diane" and the "Tennis Shoe Brigade" marched to the
state capital and dumped thousands of tennis shoes on the steps as a symbol of the children's
vulnerability. Id. One white pair of shoes had a note attached: "These are the shoes of a beauti-
ful 18-year-old girl who was murdered last summer." Id. Holding a pair of red high-top sneak-
ers was the mother of the mutilated seven year-old boy who yelled: "He could be anybody's
child. He could be anybody's grandchild." Id. Many other people soon joined in the protest,
which was eventually labeled as an "unprecedented" display of outrage by the citizens of Wash-
ington. Id. Mark Appelwick, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, described the
public mood as "near vigilantism." Id. "I feared we'd be forced to do very radical extreme
things," stated Appelwick. Id. It was under this mood that the Washington statute was passed.
105. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09 (Supp. 1996-97). The committee that developed the statute
knew that it was free to define what constituted mental illness and other diagnostic terms, and
thus decided to do so broadly. Siegel, supra note 2, at A30. The committee also asked psychia-
trists to predict those who would be dangerous in the future, though it discovered through its
research that the doctors were wrong in two out of three cases. Id. This statute served as the
pattern for the Kansas SVP Act. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996).
106. Brief for the Respondent at 1-2, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-
9075).
107. Id.
108. While eighteen states currently have sexually violent predator statutes on the books, at
this writing, only eight actively use them: Washington, California, Ohio, Illinois, Kansas, Minne-
sota, Massachusetts, and Florida. See supra notes 10-11. Thirty other states, however, are cur-
rently considering similar statutes in light of the Hendricks decision. Tom Browell, Close to
Home: A Stronger Megan's Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at C8.
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[of] ... predators," who do not have a mental disease or defect but do
have "anti-social personality features which are unamenable to ex-
isting mental illness treatment." 10 9 The SVP Act further provides that
the "likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence
... [is] ... high" and "the prognosis for rehabilitating ... [these] ...
predators ... [is] ... poor, the treatment needs of this population are
very long term and the treatment modalities for this population are
very different than the traditional treatment modalities for people ap-
propriate for commitment under the . . . [general involuntary civil
commitment statute].11 0
The SVP Act defines a "sexually violent predator" as "any person
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sex-
ual violence."' "Mental abnormality" is defined as a "congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity
which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a
degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of
others. 11 2 A "sexually violent offense" includes crimes such as rape,
indecent liberties with a child, indecent solicitation of a child, or sex-
ual exploitation of a child.113
Armed with its new statute, Kansas applied it for the first time to its
own version of Earl Shriner: a sixty-two year-old pedophile named
Leroy Hendricks, who had a career of molesting children that spanned
three decades. 114
II. KANSAS V. HENDRICKS
A. Facts
In 1984, Hendricks was convicted of taking "indecent liberties" with
two thirteen-year-old boys. 1 5 He served only ten years for this crime
instead of a possible life sentence because he accepted a plea bargain
from the state. 16 Shortly before his scheduled release, the state of
Kansas filed a petition pursuant to its newly enacted SVP Act seeking
109. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1996).
110. Id.
111. Id. § 59-29a02(a).
112. Id. § 59-29a02(b).
113. Id. § 59-29a02(e)(1-9).
114. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
115. Id. at 137.
116. Id.
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civil confinement. 117 At his jury trial, Hendricks's own testimony re-
vealed a history of repeated child molestation, which began with him
exposing his genitals to two young girls in 1955, for which he received
a $2.90 fine. 118 In 1957, he was convicted of lewdness involving a
young girl and received a brief jail sentence. 119 In 1960, while working
at a carnival, Hendricks seized the opportunity to molest two young
boys and served a two year sentence.120 After serving that sentence,
Hendricks was paroled and shortly thereafter molested a seven-year-
old girl.1 21 Hendricks was then committed to a state psychiatric hospi-
tal, where futile attempts were made to treat him; he sexually as-
saulted an eight-year-old girl and an eleven-year-old boy after being
released. 22 Imprisoned again in 1967, Hendricks refused to partici-
pate in treatment, and he was forced to remain in prison until his pa-
role in 1972.123 Hendricks then began to molest his own stepchildren,
forcing them to engage in sexual activity over a four year period. 2 4
His final conviction was for taking indecent liberties with two thir-
teen-year-old boys, for which he served a ten year prison term. 125 At
the conclusion of this sentence, the state moved to civilly commit him
as a sexually violent predator. 2 6
B. Procedural History
The initial version of the SVP Act as applied to Hendricks required
a specific sequence of procedures. First, the custodial agency was re-
quired to notify the attorney general at least sixty days prior to the
scheduled release of Hendricks under the Act.127 The prosecutor had
to decide within forty-five days to file a petition to the state court
seeking Hendricks's involuntary commitment. 128 The court made the
determination that "probable cause exist[ed] to believe that ... [Hen-
dricks was] ...a sexually violent predator.' 29 The judge then di-
117. Id. at 130.
118. Id. at 130-31; Charles Krauthammer, Don't Play a Hospital Game With Sex Offenders
Hospitals, NEWSDAY, Dec. 17, 1996, at A42.
119. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (1997).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136-37 (Kan. 1996).
126. Id. at 130.
127. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (1996). The current version of the statute requires 90 days'
notice. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a03 (West Supp. 1997).
128. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a04 (1996).
129. Id. § 59-29a05.
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rected that Hendricks be taken into custody, where a professional
evaluation was made as to the presence of a mental abnormality or
personality disorder.130 After that evaluation, a trial was held, which
determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks satisfied the
requirements of the SVP Act.131 At the conclusion of the trial, Hen-
dricks was found to be a sexually violent predator and was transferred
to the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for "control,
care and treatment until such time as . . . [Hendricks's] . . . mental
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that . . . [Hen-
dricks] ... is safe to be at large. 1 32 Hendricks appealed his commit-
ment under the SVP Act on substantive due process, double jeopardy,
and ex post facto grounds. 133
The Kansas Supreme Court accepted Hendricks's substantive due
process claim and ultimately ruled that the act was unconstitutional as
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 34 Relying in part on the
Court's ruling in Foucha,135 the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the
involuntary commitment of Hendricks absent a finding of mental ill-
ness amounted to "a showing of dangerousness without a finding of
mental illness," thus violating Supreme Court precedent. 36 The Kan-
sas court's holding centered around its doubts about the legislature's
purported reason for committing the sex offenders: "It is clear that the
overriding concern of the legislature is to continue the segregation of
sexually violent offenders from the public. Treatment with the goal of
reintegrating them into society is incidental, at best.' 37 The Kansas
court further looked for any actual treatment these individuals were
receiving with a skeptical eye, noting that the "record reflects that
treatment for sexually violent predators is all but nonexistent.' 38 The
court noted the fact that the Kansas legislature allowed for the com-
mitment of sexually violent predators who were unresponsive to treat-
ment and doubted their actual ability to be cured. 39 In light of its
analysis of the facts, the Kansas court ruled that the primary objective
of the legislature was to "continue incarceration and not to provide
130. Id.
131. Id. § 59-29a06(a).
132. Id. § 59-29a07(a).
133. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (1997).
134. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996).
135. 504 U.S. 71 (1992). See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
case.
136. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 138.
137. Id. at 136.
138. Id. At the time Hendricks was transferred to the Lamed State Hospital, there was no
treatment staff or treatment program in place at the facility. Id. at 131.
139. Id. at 131.
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treatment," which violated Hendricks's substantive due process
rights. 140
Kansas then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certio-
rari.141 In response, Hendricks filed a cross-petition, in which he reas-
serted his federal double jeopardy and ex post facto claims. 142 The
Court granted certiorari on both petitions and reversed the decision of
the Kansas Supreme Court. 143
C. Majority
Justice Thomas wrote for a five-justice majority and first addressed
the issue of substantive due process and the mental abnormality
arguments. 144
1. Substantive Due Process and Mental Abnormality
Hendricks argued that the use of mental abnormality as a standard
for civil commitment violated his substantive due process rights.145
The direction that the Court would take on this issue was established
early: "Although freedom from physical restraint 'has always been at
the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbi-
trary governmental action,' that liberty interest is not absolute . . .
[and] ... may be overridden even in the civil context."'1 46 The Court,
citing Foucha v. Louisiana,147 stated that involuntary commitment
statutes have been consistently upheld, provided that proper proce-
dures and evidentiary standards were met.148
Once those standards were satisfied in Hendricks's case, the Court
pointed out that the SVP Act required a finding of dangerousness and
proof of a mental abnormality or personality disorder. 149 Together,
those two requirements served as an accurate predictor of offenders
140. Id. at 137.
141. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1997).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2079.
145. Id. at 2076. The core of substantive due process protections lies in the right to be free
from governmental restraint. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). See infra notes 247-53
for a discussion of substantive due process rights.
146. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
147. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
148. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080; see Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71-78 (holding that mental illness
and dangerousness must be proven for involuntary commitment). For a discussion of Foucha,
see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text; see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433
(1979) (holding that findings of mental illness and dangerousness require a showing of at least
clear and convincing evidence). See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing the
Addington decision and arguments advanced by the Court).
149. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
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likely to engage in acts of predatory violence in the future.150 One of
Hendricks's main arguments, however, was that a finding of mere
mental abnormality, rather than mental illness, did not adequately sat-
isfy those requirements. The Court rejected that assertion, citing Hel-
ler v. Doe,151 Allen,152 and Pearson 153 for the proposition that mental
illness was not the only standard that would justify civil commit-
ment. 54 The Court then rejected the contention that Foucha155 stood
for the proposition that only a finding of mental illness would suffice;
instead, any analogous term would satisfy the evidentiary standards as
well.156
Finally, the Court rejected Hendricks's argument that mental ab-
normality was not analogous to previously upheld standards. 157 The
Court first submitted that even "psychiatrists disagree widely and fre-
quently on what constitutes mental illness." As a result, the legal com-
munities should not be limited to strict standards either.158 The fact
that legal terms of medical significance vary from those used in the
medical community is of no significance because "those definitions do
not... [need to] ... fit precisely with the definitions employed by the
medical community."'159 The Court held that on its face, the SVP Act
150. Id. The accuracy of the predictions for dangerousness is important in a substantive due
process analysis because the predictions must be accurate enough to narrowly limit the class of
persons committed, thereby satisfying strict scrutiny. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 180-82
(Minn. 1996).
151. 509 U.S. 312, 314-15 (1993) (permitting commitment upon a finding of mental retarda-
tion by clear and convincing evidence and a finding of mental illness beyond a reasonable
doubt).
152. 478 U.S. 364, 366 (1986) (permitting commitment upon a finding of mental illness and
dangerousness). For a discussion of the Allen decision, see supra notes 41-46 and accompanying
text.
153. 309 U.S. 270, 271-72 (1940) (permitting commitment of an individual with a "psycho-
pathic personality"); see supra notes 24-26 (discussing the Pearson decision and procedural re-
quirements imposed by the Court).
154. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
155. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). For a discussion of Foucha, see supra notes 47-
51 and accompanying text.
156. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
157. Id. The Court furthered its point by explaining that the Court has used a variety of terms
to describe the mental states of those individuals civilly committed. Id. Those terms include
"emotionally disturbed" and "mentally ill," id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26
(1979)); "incompetency," id. (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 731, 737 (1971)); and "some
medical justification for doing so," id. (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)). Upon reviewing these terms, it seems that the Court has given itself the authority to
justify civil commitment under the most broad medical terms and concepts, despite due process
concerns.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2081. The Court noted that legal definitions must account for legal ideas such as
"competency" and "individual responsibility"; therefore, they cannot exactly mirror medical
terms. Id.
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satisfied substantive due process requirements because pedophilia
qualified as a mental abnormality under the SVP Act. 160
2. Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto: The Civil - Criminal
Distinction
The Court next addressed whether the SVP Act was civil or crimi-
nal in nature in order to determine if double jeopardy and ex post
facto protections attached to the application of the SVP Act. 161 Citing
Allen,162 the Court stated that this categorization was "first of all a
question of statutory construction," where a court must first ascertain
whether the legislature intended the statute to establish a civil or crim-
inal proceeding. 163 If such an intent is found, the court ordinarily de-
fers to the legislature's stated intent. 164 Applying those rules, the
Court determined that because the Act was placed in the civil codes of
the state 165 and because the legislature described the Act as a "civil
commitment procedure,"'166 legislative intent to create a civil statute
was clear. 167 Acknowledging that a "civil label is not always disposi-
tive, '1168 the Court concluded that Hendricks had failed to meet his
burden of showing by the "clearest proof" that "the statutory scheme
... [was] ... so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate ...
[the State's] .. .intention to deem it [civil]."'1 69
In his attempt to satisfy his burden of proof, Hendricks first tried to
show that the SVP Act implicated the objectives of criminal punish-
160. Id. Although pedophilia is recognized as a serious mental disorder in the DSM-IV, the
Court did not address the issue of civil commitment based on a mental condition not recognized
in the DSM-IV. See id. at 2080-81.
161. Id. at 2081. The civil - criminal distinction was considered critical to this analysis because
ex post facto and double jeopardy protections do not apply in non-punitive contexts. Id. The ex
post facto prohibitions of the United States and all state constitutions forbid retroactive applica-
tion of penal statutes. U.S. CorNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Court has determined that a statute
must be a criminal or penal law that applies to events occurring before its effective date and must
substantially disadvantage the offender in order to violate ex post facto prohibitions. Weaver v.
Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). In Deptartment of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, however, the Court
rejected the argument that the ex post facto and double jeopardy protections only apply in the
criminal context. 511 U.S. 767, 781 (1994). Instead, the protections apply to any scheme that is
punitive in character, thus making a legislative label of civil or criminal of little importance. Id.
162. 478 U.S. 364 (1986). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 41-46 and accompany-
ing text.
163. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 368).
164. Id. at 2082.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing KAN. STAr. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 1994)).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986)).
169. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
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ment such as retribution or deterrence. 170 The Court disagreed and
stated that the Act was not retributive because prior conduct was not
used to affix culpability. 171 Instead, prior conduct was used for evi-
dentiary purposes to show a mental abnormality or dangerousness. 172
The absence of a finding of scienter further showed a non-retributive
purpose. 73 The Court then stated that the SVP Act did not function
as a deterrent because persons suffering from mental abnormalities or
personality disorders are not likely to be deterred by the possibility of
confinement. 74
Hendricks further failed to show that the SVP Act was punitive in
nature.175 The Court explained that because a person confined under
the Act is subjected to conditions similar to those endured by other
mentally ill patients, the state did not show a punitive purpose. 176 The
Court supported that finding by citing Salerno's177 proposition that
"the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment.1 78
Conversely, confinement of dangerous individuals serves as a classic
example of non-punitive detention. 179 Hendricks attempted to show
a punitive intent on the part of the state by focusing on the potentially
indefinite duration of his confinement. 180 The Court quickly rejected
the argument, emphasizing that the confinement is only indefinite
should the individual not respond to the state's primary objective of
treatment. 181
The next argument that Hendricks advanced was that the similarity
between criminal trials and civil commitment trials served as evidence
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. The Court did not address at which stage this deterrence rationale is supposed to fit.
Applied to Hendricks, the defendant could not have been deterred by this statute because it did
not exist when he committed the crimes that lead to his prison sentence. During his prison
sentence, the deterrence rationale does not fit because Hendricks did not have the opportunity
to have contact with any children, thus there was no potentially harmful conduct to deter.
175. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082-83.
176. Id. at 2082.
177. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). See supra notes 52-61 (discussing the arguments advanced by the
Court in Salerno and noting its similarity to the SVP Act.)
178. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746).
179. Id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49). The Salerno Court gave examples of non-puni-
tive detentions that have been upheld. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49; see Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524, 537-42 (1952) (upholding the detainment of potentially dangerous resident aliens dur-
ing pending deportation proceedings); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (approving de-
tention of enemy aliens during war); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909).
180. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083.
181. Id.
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that civil commitment trials are criminal in nature. 182 Again, using
Allen 18 3 as support, the Court maintained that the state's decision to
provide some of the safeguards that are applicable in criminal trials
did not automatically transform a civil proceeding into a criminal
one.' 84 Rather, these safeguards merely demonstrated the state's con-
cern for ensuring that only a narrow class of dangerous individuals
would be committed using only the strictest procedural standards. 185
Hendricks's final argument proposed that the lack of legitimate
treatment for his purported mental abnormality demonstrated a puni-
tive purpose. 186 Without such treatment, Hendricks argued that his
confinement amounted "to little more than disguised punishment.' 187
Once again, the Court rejected Hendricks's claims. 188 The Court cited
A1len 189 for the proposition that while civil commitment statutes have
been upheld where they both incapacitate and treat, a state had never
been required to refrain from civil commitment merely because no
treatment was yet available. 190 The Court noted that a "state could
hardly be seen as furthering a 'punitive' purpose by involuntarily con-
fining persons afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious
disease."191
Turning next to the Kansas Supreme Court's decision to label the
SVP Act punitive because the state had failed to actually treat those
committed, the Court reasoned that even if treatment was an ancillary
rather than a primary objective, that is still not enough to make the
SVP Act punitive and, therefore, criminal in nature. 92 In response to
Hendricks's argument that he had not been receiving the statutorily
obligated treatment, the Court merely stated that because Hendricks
was the first person committed under the SVP Act, the state was not
required to have all of its treatment procedures in place. 193 The Court
then dismissed that issue by citing the state's claim made at oral argu-
182. Id.
183. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 364 (1986). See supra notes 41-46 (holding that civil com-
mitment procedures were civil in nature because of the state's disavowed intent to punish and its
emphasis on treatment).
184. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083 (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 371-72).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Allen, 478 U.S. at 364.
190. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084 (citing Allen, 478 U.S. at 373). The Court argued that these
offenders should not be released just because treatments have not been effective or that success-
ful treatments are unavailable. Id.
191. Id. at 2083.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2085.
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ment that "persons committed .. . [were] . . .now receiving in the
neighborhood of '31.5 hours of treatment per week.' ' 194
Upon concluding that the Kansas SVP Act was civil rather than
criminal in nature, the Court then dismissed the alleged violations of
the double jeopardy and ex post facto prohibitions:' 95 "Because we
have determined that the Kansas Act is civil in nature, initiation of its
commitment proceedings does not constitute a second prosecu-
tion.' 96 Furthermore, the Court failed to find a punitive purpose
under the SVP Act, which allowed civil commitment of an individual
even after a completed prison term.197 Citing Baxstrom v. Herold,198
the Court stated that "there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing
the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term
from all other civil commitments.' ' 199 The Court dismissed the claims
of an ex post facto violation on the same basis as it rejected the double
jeopardy arguments.200
D. The Concurrence
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy recognized that if Kansas had
used treatment as a "sham or mere pretext" to civilly commit Hen-
dricks, then "there would have been an indication of the forbidden
purpose to punish."' 20' He further "caution[ed] against dangers inher-
ent when a civil confinement law is used in conjunction with the crimi-
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2085-86; see supra note 161 and accompanying text (discussing why double jeop-
ardy and ex post facto are not applicable protections in civil procedures).
196. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
197. Id.
198. 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (striking a statute that allowed civil commitment at the end of a
prison term without jury review). For further discussion of this case, see supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text.
199. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086 (citing Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111-12). It should be noted
that this excerpt cited from Baxstrom was taken out of context by the Hendricks Court; there-
fore, it slightly misstates the holding in Baxstrom. The Baxstrom Court stated:
For purposes of granting judicial review before a jury of the question on whether a
person is mentally ill and in need of institutionalization, there is no conceivable basis
for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term
from all other civil commitments.
Baxtrom, 383 U.S. at 111-12. The Hendricks Court omitted the first half of the sentence and
quoted the remainder to support the proposition that there is no conceivable basis to distinguish
between the commitments pursuant to any purpose. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086. The Bax-
strom Court limited the statement to the purpose of jury review, a much narrower proposition
than used by the Hendricks Court. Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111-12.
200. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086. For an explanation of the civil - criminal distinction, see
supra note 161 and accompanying text.
201. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2086.
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nal process, whether or not the law is given retroactive application." 20 2
Justice Kennedy noted the possibility of the civil commitment system
being used to make up for a mistake or pitfall of the criminal system,
such as where the prosecution had plea bargained with the defendant
and regretted it later.20 3 In such a case, the principles of retribution or
general deterrence may be implicated, and such a commitment system
would have to be invalidated. 20 4 The final note of concern that the
concurrence expressed was the possibility that "mental abnormality
* . .[would be] .. .too imprecise a category" to justify civil commit-
ment.20 5 If so, the Court's earlier precedents would not uphold the
SVP Act. 20 6
E. The Dissent
Justice Breyer's dissent in this case was joined by two justices and
one justice in part.207 Upon addressing the substantive due process
issue, the three justices agreed that "Kansas... [had] ... acted within
the limits that the due process clause substantively sets. '20 8
The three dissenters maintained that debates in the psychiatric com-
munity over the use of mental abnormality as a standard for civil com-
mitment are irrelevant because the Constitution allows a state to pick
one reasonable view over another equally reasonable one: "The psy-
chiatric debate ... helps to inform the law by setting the bounds of
what is reasonable, but it cannot here decide just how States must
write their laws within those bounds. '20 9 They further asserted that
the statute's definitions were correctly applied to Hendricks because
202. Id.
203. Id. This statement by Justice Kennedy suggests that if the statute had been interpreted as
constituting a punishment of Hendricks, he would have struck it down. While he did not agree
with the use of sexually violent predator acts as a remedy for regretful plea bargains on the
criminal side, it seems troubling that he would allow them to remedy such plea bargains as long
as the Court labels them civil instead of criminal. Id. This interpretation would allow many
states to induce a sexual predator into pleading guilty pursuant to a plea bargain, knowing all
along that they will be able to commence civil commitment procedures at the end of the prison
sentence anyway.
204. Id.
205. Id. The concurrence in this case agreed that mental abnormality presently satisfies sub-
stantive due process standards. Id. Justice Kennedy, however, left open the possibility that fur-
ther research will show that mental abnormality is too broad and imprecise to justify civil
commitment. Id.
206. Id. at 2087.
207. Justice Ginsburg did not join with the dissent in Part I, which concluded that the civil
commitment of Hendricks had comported with substantive due process requirements. Hen-
dricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087-90.
208. Id. at 2088.
209. Id.
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he had a history of inability to control his actions, noting that people
like him had been considered insane for purposes of commitment in
the past. 210 The dissenters unanimously disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the SVP Act was not punitive and, therefore, was not
violative of ex post facto prohibitions. 211
The dissent argued that the SVP Act strongly resembled "tradi-
tional criminal punishment" schemes, first noting that both implicated
"'secure' confinement .. .against one's will."212 The dissent further
asserted that the SVP Act's basic objective of protecting the public
from these offenders is no different from incapacitation, a common
and traditional purpose of the criminal law.213 The dissent maintained
that "one of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is
to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make im-
prisonment any the less punishment. ' 214 The dissent also criticized
the emphasis the majority placed on the Kansas legislature's labeling
of the SVP Act as civil, noting that the Court has often looked beyond
the civil label in close cases. 215  The dissenters agreed that this was
such a case.
21 6
After noting all the other similarities between traditional criminal
procedures and the SVP Act, 217 the dissent maintained that the most
important factor in determining the nature of the SVP Act was the
emphasis placed on treatment.218 Acknowledging that the presence of
incapacitation theories is not enough to render a law punitive,219 the
dissent argued that "when a State believes that treatment does exist,
and then couples that admission with a legislatively required delay of
such treatment until a person is at the end of his jail term (so that
further incapacitation is therefore necessary), such a legislative
scheme begins to look punitive.1220
210. Id. at 2088-89. Cases cited by the dissent included Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S.
270, 274 (1940) (allowing civil commitment of a person with utter lack of control over sexual
impulses), and In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 122, 125 (Mass. 1845) (Shaw, C.J.) (noting historical civil
commitment of those considered furiously mad). Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2088-89.
211. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2091 (citing United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082-83. The dissent noted that both commitment procedures
utilized county personnel, a trial by jury, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and psychiat-
ric evaluations. Id. at 2091.
218. Id. at 2091.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2091-92.
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The dissent also took issue with the discrepancy between Kansas
state legislature's words and its actions.221 The dissenters agreed with
the Kansas Supreme Court and criticized the majority for not giving
its decision proper deference. 222 Arguing that the Kansas court's rec-
ord provided proper support for its conclusion, the dissent analyzed
the intent of the legislature in the same way as the Kansas court.223
Pointing first to the Kansas legislature's failure to provide Hendricks
with the treatment that justified his commitment, the dissent said that
this failure reflected punitive intentions.224 Suspicious of the legisla-
ture's intentions, the dissent also questioned why a legislature so con-
cerned with treating these individuals would wait "years after the
criminal act that indicated its necessity, '225 or would leave an offender
in a prison where the prognosis for rehabilitation is poor.226 The dis-
sent concluded that "the timing provisions of the statute confirm the
Kansas Supreme Court's view that treatment was not a particularly
important legislative objective. '227
The next major argument the dissent advanced to show the uncon-
stitutionality of the Kansas SVP Act was the legislature's lack of con-
sideration of less restrictive alternatives. 228 They noted that "a failure
to consider or use 'alternative and less harsh methods' to achieve a
non-punitive objective can demonstrate that the legislature's actual in-
tent was to punish. '229 The dissent concluded that "legislation that
seeks almost exclusively to incapacitate the individual through con-
finement would not necessarily concern itself with potentially less re-
strictive alternatives. ' 230 The dissent compared the Kansas statute to
the sixteen other states with similar legislation23' and noted that ten of
221. Id. at 2092-93.
222. Id. at 2092.
223. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2094.
226. Id.
227. Id. The dissent argued that because treatment was delayed until the very end of the
prison sentence, it served as evidence of a motive other than treatment, because a state so con-
cerned with treatment of sex offenders would have initiated such treatment much earlier. Id.
While the legislature did state that prognosis for treatment in a prison setting is poor, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01, it maintained that some treatment would be better than no treatment at
all. Id.
228. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095. An example of some less restrictive alternatives may be
found in the Washington statute. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.092 (West Supp. 1996-97).
These alternatives include conditional release under the supervision of the superintendent of a
special commitment center, a community corrections officer. Id. Washington also provides se-
cure housing within the community in which the parolee lives. Id.
229. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
230. Id.
231. Id.
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these states initiated treatment soon after apprehending the sex of-
fender.232 Although seven other states do delay civil commitment un-
til after a criminal sentence, six of those require consideration of less
restrictive alternatives.233 The one state that does not consider less
restrictive alternative is Iowa, but that state does not apply the statute
retroactively. 234 Examining other states' statutes, therefore, con-
firmed the Kansas Supreme Court's and the dissent's opinions that the
Kansas statute was more severe than other sexually violent predator
statutes.23
5
The final argument the dissent advanced was the majority's failure
to assess the case from the facts as applied to Hendricks.236 The dis-
sent was not suggesting that Hendricks should not be confined be-
cause he was not treatable but because he was not treated. 237
According to the dissent, the state had failed in its statutory obligation
to provide treatment to a person who was civilly committed in order
to receive treatment.238 Additionally, the dissent criticized the major-
ity's acceptance of Kansas's argument that Hendricks was now receiv-
ing treatment, arguing that the facts were not part of the original
record and, therefore, should not have been considered by the Court
in its decision.239
Applying these findings to its own analysis, the dissent cited Ken-
nedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 240 a case in which the Court listed the fol-
lowing seven factors to help determine whether a statute was punitive
for Fifth and Sixth Amendment purposes: (1) whether the sanction
involved affirmative restraint; (2) how the sanction had been regarded
historically; (3) whether the statute applied to activity already crimi-
nal; (4) whether a finding of scienter is needed; (5) how the act relates
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601, 4606B (West Supp. 1996-97)); CAL. WELE.
& INST. CODE ANN. § 6607, 6608 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09 (West 1996);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4-27.11d (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.090 (West Supp.
1996-97); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980.06(2)(b) (West Supp. 1993-94).
234. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095 (citing IowA CODE ANN. § 709C.12). The current version
of this statute can be found at IowA CODE ANN. § 901A (West Supp. 1997).
235. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095.
236. Id. at 2096.
237. Id.
238. Id. The Kansas statute provides that "treatment of the sexually violent predator is found
to be necessary by the legislature." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01. Thus, the failure of the hospi-
tal to provide the necessary treatment was a breach of its responsibility pursuant to this statute.
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining
that commitment based upon a need for treatment, without providing treatment, would not bear
a reasonable relation to the purpose of the confinement).
239. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2096-97.
240. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
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to traditional aims of punishment; (6) whether a nonpunitive alterna-
tive purpose exists; and (7) whether the sanction is excessive in rela-
tion to that purpose.241 Paraphrasing those factors, the dissent applied
them to the SVP Act:
[T]he Act before us involves an affirmative restraint historically re-
garded as punishment; imposed upon behavior already a crime after
a finding of scienter; which restraint, namely confinement, serves a
traditional aim of punishment, does not primarily serve an alterna-
tive purpose (such as treatment) and is excessive in relation to any
alternative purpose assigned. 242
The dissent concluded that this Act was, in fact, designed to further
confine Leroy Hendricks.243 The dissent stated that the confinement
under the SVP Act imposes punishment; therefore, it violates the ex
post facto prohibition.244
III. ANALYSIS
The Court has consistently upheld civil commitment statutes that
were enacted pursuant to the state's police power. 245 One must ask,
however, whether the SVP Act was created within that permissible
civil commitment scheme or whether it serves as an example of the
infamous slippery slope, where a state has pushed, and thereby rede-
fined, the constitutional limits originally created by the Court. The
two aspects of this decision that possibly redefined the original limits
were the acceptance of mental abnormality as a standard for civil
commitment and the decision that the SVP Act as applied to Hen-
dricks was civil rather than criminal in nature. The remaining sections
of this Note will analyze those two issues.
A. Substantive Due Process and the Use of Mental Abnormality
and Dangerousness
"In conjuring up such an idiosyncratic definition of mental disorder,
the legislature has gone beyond the bounds of any behavioral dysfunc-
tion recognized by mental health professionals and created a hopeless
muddle." 246
241. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2098 (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2079-80.
246. John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or Lottery? A
Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET L. REV. 755, 764 (1992) (analyzing the Washington
Sexually Violent Predator Act, which served as the guideline of the Kansas SVP Act).
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The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects individuals from being deprived
of life, liberty, or property by the states without due process of law.247
The procedural component of due process requires the government to
follow proper procedures when infringing on the rights of individu-
als.2 48 Additionally, courts consistently hold that the substantive com-
ponent of this clause prevents the government from acting in such a
way as to "shock[ ] the conscience, '2 49 even if done through proper
procedures. 250 As Hendricks argued in his brief to the Court, "the
core of substantive due process in this Court's modern jurisprudence
is that some limitations on individual liberty are beyond the state's
authority even if it purports to accompany them with procedural
mechanisms that appear to allow fair adjudication. ' 251 Because civil
commitment schemes significantly deprive an individual of his or her
fundamental liberty interests, those schemes must comport with the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirements. 252 Thus, the
commitment must bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which
the person was committed and be narrowly tailored to serve that
purpose .253
1. Mental Illness Does Not Equal Mental Abnormality
While the Court has mandated that involuntary commitment to a
mental hospital requires substantive due process protection, little gui-
dance has been offered as to the narrowly tailored schemes that will
pass constitutional muster. 254 The Hendricks Court allowed for the
use of mental abnormality as a standard for the SVP Act's commit-
ment scheme, reasoning that the states have always been free to coin
and define terms that will be used in statutes, which in turn, do not
247. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
248. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
249. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
250. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
251. Brief for Respondent at 12, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-9075).
252. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983).
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 483 (1980) (holding that procedural safeguards
such as notice, an adversary hearing, and counsel must be afforded to the defendant in a civil
commitment hearing); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (noting that the gravity of
involuntary civil commitment and the risk of erroneous decisions require a clear and convincing
evidence standard for involuntary civil commitment); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975) (requiring evidentiary showing of dangerousness and mental illness in order to involunta-
rily commit an individual); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 (1966) (requiring jury review
before involuntary civil commitment); Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1940)
(upholding statute in part because it provided for procedural due process protections such as
right to counsel, judicial review, and right to call witnesses).
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need to "fit precisely" with their medical counterparts. 255 The Court
added that previous cases have allowed the use of other mental disor-
ders that are similar to the mental illness standard.2 56 The purported
similarity between these two definitions is, however, inaccurate.
Mental illness requires the existence of a mental disorder, which is
defined as a "clinically significant behavioral or psychological syn-
drome, or pattern that is associated with present distress, disability,
suffering, or loss of freedom. 2 57 In order to accurately label any per-
son as mentally ill, the mental health professional must first diagnose
the person as suffering from a mental disorder using diagnostic criteria
set forth in the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV"). 258 Second, the pro-
fessional must determine whether that disorder is "of a type and
severity which would merit the label of 'mental illness." 259 The SVP
Act has managed to escape this evidentiary standard by using the term
mental abnormality.
Mental abnormality is not a recognized diagnostic term in the psy-
chiatric community and is not defined in the DSM-IV. Because
mental abnormality may encompass those mental disorders that
would not warrant civil commitment, it is a more lenient standard and
is, therefore, not synonymous with mental illness. Instead, it is merely
a legislatively-created term that does not take into account the rigor-
ous evidentiary standards required to properly diagnose mental ill-
ness.260 The variance between the two terms has been the source of
debate about whether the use of mental abnormality should be al-
lowed in civil commitment statutes.
The arguments against the use of mental abnormality are best ex-
pressed by Professor Stephen Morse.261 He argues that mental abnor-
mality is "not a recognized diagnostic term [but is] simply a
description of the causation of any behavior. For example, mental ab-
normality might be defined as 'a congenital or acquired condition...
which predisposes the person to write law review articles, to read law
255. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (1997).
256. Id.
257. Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington State Psychiatric Association in Support of Respon-
dent at 3-4, Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (citing AMERICAN PSYCHI-
ATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS XXiii,
xxvii. (4th ed. 1994) (hereinafter "DSM-IV")).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Robert M. Wettstein, Predators And Politics: A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's
Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597 (1992).
261. Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay of Preventative Detention, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 113, 137 (1996).
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review articles, or to engage in any other activity."' 262 He further ar-
gues that "it is strange, if not incoherent, to define an abnormality by
reference to a penal code. If the penal code becomes more forgiving,
do the people who now satisfy the definition automatically become
'mentally abnormal?"263 In agreement with that view is Professor
John Q. La Fond, who states that use of mental abnormality is a "pure
tautology, conflating both diagnosis and prediction with a single inci-
dent of criminal behavior. ''2 64 Because the term is vague and easily
distorted, he is concerned with a legislature abusing or misapplying it
in the civil commitment system.265
The competing argument is that a legal term does not and should
not be required to correspond exactly with its medical counterpart. 266
The Court agrees and has indicated that it will defer to legislative de-
cisions as to statutory terms and definitions. 267 This blind deference
to state decisions, however, leaves much room for abuse and substan-
tive due process problems if overly vague terms are used. While this
may not be an overriding concern in Hendricks's case because
pedophilia is a widely recognized serious mental disorder,268 the Court
failed to articulate a standard for use by states applying current stat-
utes or in drafting future statutes.
In addition, the Court did not instruct the states with regard to how
the legislative terms must "fit" with their medical counterparts. The
problems posed by this competing view is evident in two main re-
spects. The first problem exists because these statutes require that a
person be diagnosed with a mental abnormality, illness, or disorder,
and therefore, an expert evaluation and opinion is required by a per-
son who is trained in the mental health field.269 A lack of compatibil-
ity between the terms used by the legal community and those used by
the mental health communities could lead to confusion and disagree-
ment.270 The second problem is that even considering the fact that
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. La Fond, supra note 246, at 764.
265. Id. at 764-65.
266. Robert Teir, Approaches To Sexual Predators: Community Notification and Civil Com-
mitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405, 421 (1997).
267. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997).
268. See id. at 2081 (citing 1 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TREATMENTS OF PSYCHI-
ATRIC DISORDERS 617, 633 (1989); Gene G. Abel & Joanne L. Rouleau, Male Sex Offenders, in
HANDBOOK OF OUTPATIENT TREATMENTS OF ADULTS 271 (M. Tahse et al. eds., 1990)).
269. Arthur L. Brody & Richard Green, Washington State's Unscientific Approach to the
Problem of Repeat Sex Offenders, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 343, 353-54 (1994).
270. See Katherine P. Blakey, The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders in
an Appropriate Compromise Between "Mad" and "Bad" - A Study of Minnesota's Sexual Psy-
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legal definitions must incorporate legal terms and standards not used
in the mental health profession, these legal terms still must comport to
standards of reasonableness: standards of reasonableness that are first
set by the mental health experts.271 Thus, when basing civil commit-
ment upon a finding of a mental disorder and dangerousness, logic
dictates that approval should be sought from the experts who would
later interpret them. Allowing states to draft and define terms with-
out a minimum standard of reasonableness may cause great expansion
of the use of civil commitment. 272 Under the Court's analysis, such a
slippery slope is very likely due to the Court's acceptance of mental
abnormality as a justification for involuntary civil commitment.
2. The Added Ambiguity of "Dangerousness"
The Court may have thought that because the mental abnormality
must be coupled with a separate finding of dangerousness, there is no
room for the abuses described above. A finding of dangerousness,
however, is not a widely agreed upon predictor either. As Christo-
pher Slobogin asserts, the use of dangerousness as a legal criterion is
often attacked on two grounds: (1) dangerousness should not be con-
sidered a justification for intervention in order to protect the public
from dangerous individuals; and (2) dangerousness cannot be pre-
dicted with sufficient accuracy to allow government intervention. 273
Those who agree with the use of dangerousness argue that govern-
ment must be able to incapacitate a dangerous individual before any
harm is done. 274 In addressing that argument, Slobogin and other op-
ponents point out that two distinct harms may "result from locking
people up on predicted status, rather than [for] acts they have com-
mitted. ' 275 The first harm occurs to the preventatively detained indi-
vidual: "[C]onfinement of John for something he has not yet done
could convince him that he is 'incorrigible' and that further antisocial
behavior is inevitable. At the same time, such confinement could eas-
chopathic Personality Statute, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227, 260 (1996) (noting
problems that courts have had applying medical terminology in a legal setting).
271. See Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness as a Criterion in the Criminal Process, in LAW,
MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 360, 377-79 (1996) (arguing that experts in the field
of human behavior are needed in order to adequately judge dangerousness, provided proper
procedural mechanisms are in place to limit the testimony only to the likelihood of future dan-
gerous activity).
272. See Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 111 HARV. L. REV. 259, 268-69
(1997) (arguing that the application of mental abnormality as a standard of commitment could
eventually allow for the civil commitment of virtually anyone).
273. Slobogin, supra note 271, at 365.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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ily lessen his respect for the system, an attitude that has been found to
correlate positively with recidivism. ' 276 The second harm is inflicted
on the moral tone of society. 277 When people believe that they can be
confined for who they are or for what they are capable of doing,
rather than for something they have actually done, that belief takes
away any incentive to be law abiding citizens. 278
Slobogin further disagrees with overemphasizing dangerousness to
civilly commit individuals. Citing recent research on the accuracy
rates of mental health professionals, statistics have shown that the pre-
dictions have only been fifty percent accurate. 279 Another commenta-
tor, Michael Tonry, agrees and adds that he has found only a thirty-
three percent accuracy rate. 280 Criticizing the court's use of these pre-
dictions, Tonry argues that if our system requires proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt to incarcerate an individual criminally, and clear and
convincing evidence to commit civilly, then our system should not jus-
tify such commitment on a prediction that is plagued with only a
thirty-three percent accuracy rate.281
In the conclusion of his article, Slobogin recommends that as long
as facts concerning past behavior and personality traits are proven and
certain procedures such as periodic review and time-limited interven-
tion are utilized, a proper balance may be struck between public
safety, individual rights, and therapeutic goals.282 All too often,
though, that balance is not struck. States need proper guidance and
boundaries of reasonableness, which are determined by research
within the psychiatric and medical professions. The majority in Hen-
dricks has indicated that states are free to draft and define their own
statutes according to legal standards only, without adequate regard to
the opinions of the medical and mental health experts.28 3 Unfortu-
276. Id. at 365-66.
277. Id. at 366.
278. Id.
279. Slobogin, supra note 271, at 365.
280. Michael Tonry, Prediction and Classification: Legal and Ethical Issues, 9 CRIME & JUST.
367, 395 (1987).
281. Id.
282. Slobogin, supra note 271, at 379.
283. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080-81 (1997). Not only did the Court imply that
states are essentially free to draft medically based terms without reference to their medical coun-
terparts, the Court further asserted that a state would be free to define terms pertaining to
"areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties" because such disagreement between the
medical experts affords legislators even wider latitude. Id. at 2081 n.3. Taken literally, this even
wider area of latitude seems illogical because legislators are, in effect, providing answers to ques-
tions that even trained experts have been unable to answer. Should the choice made by the
legislature later be proven wrong, a strong argument can be made that commitment based on an
erroneous standard constitutes a violation of the defendant's due process rights. See supra notes
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nately, the legal community is neither qualified nor adequately trained
to make such judgments on its own.
Another problem in the dangerousness analysis is another failure by
the Court to articulate a minimum required standard. In its own inter-
pretation of the SVP Act, the Court stated that the dangerousness
prong requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior.284 All that
seems necessary, therefore, to satisfy the dangerousness prong in an
involuntary civil commitment hearing is a showing of the defendant's
past crimes. The Court ruled that this was sufficient under due pro-
cess standards because "[p]revious instances of violent behavior are
an important indicator of future violent tendencies. '285
3. The Union of "Mental Abnormality" and "Dangerousness"
Because of the lack of guidance surrounding the application of
mental abnormality and dangerousness in civil commitment statutes,
the Court has effectively given the states authority to involuntarily
commit virtually anyone. For example, these relaxed standards may
eventually allow civil commitment of drug addicts because of their
tendency to commit robberies in order to obtain money for more
drugs. These nebulous standards may also allow for civil commitment
of alcoholics because of their tendency to drive under the influence
and cause traffic accidents and deaths. While these examples may
seem unlikely or far-fetched, a close look at the SVP Act reveals that
the Court has allowed for the involuntarily commitment of an individ-
ual who is "a menace to the health and safety of others. '286 Appar-
ently, a state only needs to select a crime that it considers worthy of
involuntary civil commitment and then narrowly tailor the language of
the statute to fit only those people. Here, Kansas chose crimes such as
rape, indecent liberties with a child, or indecent solicitation of a
child.287 While the aforementioned crimes are considered reprehensi-
ble by the average member of society, the same may be said about
robbery and alcohol-related traffic deaths.
Scholars who agree with the use of mental abnormality and danger-
ousness as a standard for civil commitment argue that such abuses
would never occur because of judicial review based on constitutional
principles such as vagueness and other substantive due process com-
247-53 (explaining why the accuracy of the evidence justifying civil commitment is important to
the substantive due process analysis).
284. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2080.
285. Id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993)).
286. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-a02(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
287. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-a02(e)(1-9).
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ponents. 288 The Court in this case, however, gave great deference to
the Kansas legislature, holding that a state has always been free to
draft its own statutory terms and definitions.289 Because Kansas was
able to couch its terms in a purportedly non-punitive statute, the
Court adhered to the state's named intent.290 Such a non-punitive
statute is able to avoid violating many constitutional protections. 291
Additionally, once the decision is made to label a statute as civil, that
decision will be overturned only upon a showing of the "clearest
proof" that the statute is, in fact, criminal. 292 This standard is very
hard to satisfy; thus, this great deference given to legislative intent is
very hard to override.293
B. Turning Punitive Into Non-Punitive: The Role of Justice
"Copperfield"
The Hendricks Court held that the SVP Act was non-punitive in
nature. This section argues that the Court's excessive deference to the
stated non-punitive purpose of the statute allowed Kansas, and will
allow other states in the future, to give a punitive statute a civil dis-
guise by purporting to provide treatment. This section also argues
that treatment is not effective for these offenders and that the Kansas
legislature knew this when it enacted this statute, which demonstrates
Kansas's intent to find a way to remedy hastily made plea bargains.
Finally, this section argues that the Kansas legislature's failure to con-
sider less restrictive alternatives illustrates intent to merely extend a
prison term because civil commitment is not the only therapeutic solu-
tion for sex offenders.
The Court's decision to label the SVP Act as civil rather than crimi-
nal in nature significantly diminished the procedural and constitu-
tional rights to which an individual committed under them would be
entitled.294 As explored by various scholars, "[d]eeply embedded in
Anglo-American law ... is a sharp procedural divide between crimi-
nal and civil cases. ' 295 While the Constitution imposes limitations on
288. For a full discussion of the limitations these protections place on governmental action,
see supra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
289. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 (1997).
290. Id. at 2082.
291. Id. at 2085-86.
292. Id. at 2082 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
293. See text infra at IV.B.
294. See supra note 161 and accompanying text for further legal analysis of these concepts.
295. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and The Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 777 (1997).
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the state such as protections against double jeopardy,296 ex post
facto,297 and burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,298 the Court
has held that such protections need not be employed in civil proce-
dures.299 The determination of whether a statute is civil or criminal in
nature is, therefore, highly significant.
As the majority in Hendricks noted, determining the nature of a
statute "is first of all a question of statutory construction. '300 Then
the majority noted that the SVP Act was placed in the civil codes and
that its description as a "civil commitment procedure" determined
that a civil statute had been created. 301 Although the Court seems to
have reached this conclusion easily, Justice Marshall criticized such a
method of analysis in his dissent in Salerno.30 2 "The majority's tech-
nique for infringing this right is simple: merely redefine any measure
which is claimed to be punishment as 'regulation,' and, magically, the
Constitution no longer prohibits its imposition. ' 303 The following sec-
tions discuss the shortcomings of the magic performed by the majority
in Hendricks.
1. Legislative Intent and the Interjected Purpose
The Hendricks Court placed great emphasis on the legislature's in-
tent to label the SVP Act civil in nature, 30 4 but a court's emphasis on
legislative intent is often criticized on two grounds. First, it may not
always be possible to discern the true intent of the legislature.305 Be-
cause a court places great weight on a statute's label, legislators may
purposely couch a punitive statute in civil terms, so that courts would
recognize the statutes as civil. Legislative history may be even more
indeterminate because a cunning politician may "inject statements in-
tended solely to influence the later interpretation of the statute. ' 30 6
The second criticism of the Court's emphasis on the legislature's civil
label for the SVP statute is that a Constitution can hardly protect the
296. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
297. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3.
298. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
299. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (holding that civil commitment does not
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2085-86 (1997).
300. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1980)).
301. Id. at 2081-82.
302. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
303. Id. (emphasis added).
304. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081-82.
305. Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1005, 1016 (1992).
306. Id.
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rights of the punished when courts focus on the subjective motivations
of the punisher: "The value of these protections would be greatly di-
minished, if not annihilated, were their applicability dependent on the
motives ascribed to the very institution whose powers they are meant
to limit. '30 7
Perhaps the leading critic in this area is Max Radin, author of Statu-
tory Interpretation.30 8 He criticized the emphasis placed on the labels
made by legislators, arguing that "[t]he chances that of several hun-
dred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in
mind . . . are infinitesimally small. '309 Radin asks this perplexing
question: "What gives the intention of the legislature obligating
force?" 310 In the realm of separation of powers, the function of the
legislature is to "utter[ ] the words of a statute," 311 while the function
of the courts is to interpret those words. 312 Assigning the interpretive
role to the legislature infringes upon the court's role.
Further, as the legislature emphasized a concern for Hendricks's
needs, particularly treatment, there was no explanation why treatment
was stalled for so many years while Hendricks sat in a prison cell,
where the prognosis for treatment is poor.313 While the majority
chose not to analyze that inconsistency between the state's actions and
the state's words, the dissent argues, and this Note agrees, that a state
so overwhelmingly concerned with treating and helping these individ-
uals would have started treatment long ago. 314
Another failure in the majority's statutory interpretation was the
emphasis placed on the objective purpose of the statute, which ig-
nored a crucial analysis of the legislature's subjective intent. While an
objective reading of the statute may cause a reasonable person to be-
lieve that the legislature actually wanted to treat Hendricks, the dis-
sent articulated very persuasive arguments that Hendricks was really
incapacitated under the guise of treatment. 31 5
Despite the arguments of various scholars in the area of statutory
construction, a defendant may be able to overcome the Court's deci-
307. Maria Foscarinis, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1667, 1673 (1980).
308. 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
309. Id. at 870.
310. Id. at 871.
311. Id. at 871-72.
312. Id. at 871.
313. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1996).
314. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2093-94 (1997).
315. See supra notes 218-35 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's rationale for con-
cluding that the Kansas legislature really did not envision treatment as the sole purpose of the
SVP Act).
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sion to label a statute civil by satisfying the "clearest proof" doc-
trine.316  The "clearest proof" doctrine provides that a court will
negate a legislature's intent to deem a measure non-punitive only
upon the a showing of clearest proof that the statute is, in fact, misla-
beled. 317 First adopted in Flemming v. Nestor,318 the clearest proof
doctrine has developed into nearly an irrebuttable presumption favor-
ing the legislature. 319 This test, as applied to a case like Hendricks, has
been recently reformulated into what is referred to as the Ward-Men-
doza test.320
According to scholar Gregory Porter, the Ward-Mendoza test
should be applied to defendants who seek protections traditionally
limited to criminal proceedings. 321 Here, Hendricks argued for pro-
tections against double jeopardy and ex post facto. The first prong of
this test requires a court to discern whether the statute is civil or crimi-
nal by looking to the express language of the statute. 322 Once a deci-
sion is made to label a statute civil, it may be overcome only by a
showing of "the clearest proof. ' ' 323 In determining whether this show-
ing has been made, courts generally rely on the seven factors articu-
lated by the Hendricks dissent. 32 4 The dissent determined that the
facts in Hendricks overcame this presumption. 325 Since the creation
of this test, however, a majority of the Court has never found such a
situation.32 6 This raises the question of whether Hendricks really had
a chance against the Kansas legislature.
316. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
317. Id.
318. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
319. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (summarizing the how the Court applied
this test in Hendricks).
320. Gregory Y. Porter, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court's Ongoing Struggle With
Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517, 550 (1997).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 617-21 (1960)).
324. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2098 (1997) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza, 372 U.S.
144, 168-69 (1963)). See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case
and application of the seven factors.
325. Id. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2095.
326. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinctions, 42 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 1325, 1358 (1991) (explaining that since the case was decided, the Court has never
used the factors to find that a legislative scheme is criminal rather than civil in nature).
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2. Treatment versus Punishment
a. The Treatment Disguise as Applied to Hendricks
In its brief discussion of the distinction between treatment and pun-
ishment, the majority argued that the SVP Act was civil in nature be-
cause Kansas cited treatment of sex offenders as its primary
purpose.327 The Kansas Supreme Court, as well as the Hendricks dis-
sent, called treatment an attempt to disguise a criminal statute.328
The Hendricks Court countered that even if treatment was not the
primary goal of the SVP Act, that was still insufficient to render the
statute punitive. 329 This holding, however, seems inconsistent with
earlier cases, which placed emphasis on the actual treatment the pris-
oners received. For example, in Jackson v. Indiana,330 the Court held
that the nature of a psychiatric commitment must bear some relation
to its purpose.331 In Allen,332 the Court emphasized that the civil label
was contingent upon prisoners actually receiving treatment. 333 Like-
wise, in Foucha,334 the Court held that allowing a "disorder for which
there is no effective treatment" 335 to serve as the basis for involuntary
commitment was only a step away from allowing detention based on
dangerousness alone.336 Finally, as Justice Blackmun stated in
Youngberg,337 when a state bases the "deprivation of liberty.., upon
a promise of treatment, [it] ineluctably has committed the commu-
nity's resources to providing minimal treatment. '338 This line of cases
illustrates that the Court was previously concerned with whether these
individuals were actually receiving the required treatment.
Conversely, the Hendricks Court held that the state does not need
to show that it has entered into treatment contracts or that it has hired
any qualified staff to administer the treatment. 339 Additionally, the
327. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
328. Id.; In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996).
329. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2084.
330. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
331. Id. at 738.
332. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). For further discussion of this principle, see supra
notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
333. Allen, 478 U.S. at 373.
334. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). See supra notes 47-51 (discussing the require-
ments set forth by the Foucha Court in order to civilly commit a defendant).
335. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82.
336. Id. at 82-83.
337. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
338. Id. at 326 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 168
(3d Cir. 1980)).
339. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2093 (1997). At oral argument, the prosecution
stated that committed offenders had been receiving approximately 31.5 hours of treatment per
week. Id. at 2085. Part of Hendricks's argument involved the fact that he had not been receiving
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state may stall the purported treatment for at least ten months (pre-
sumably longer if the prisoner does not sue) 340 and still be found
within the minimum standards of treatment requirement. 341 Such a
blatant disregard for the treatment actually provided for Hendricks
sends a strong message to other states that providing treatment is not
as important as simply saying that treatment is the legislation's pur-
pose. This will allow a state to provide very little treatment and be
unconcerned about its effectiveness. This will effectively allow states
to succeed in extending a previous prison sentence without helping
the offender.
b. The Highly Questionable Effectiveness of Treatment: The
Chocolate Cake Problem
The controversial debate over the effectiveness of treatment was
most effectively analogized by retired FBI agent John Douglas, who
worked as a criminal profiler in the Investigative Support Unit at
Quantico: "This is the way my co-workers, associates, and I view reha-
bilitation of sexual predators, particularly serial sexual predators
"342
You've baked this chocolate cake which smells great and looks
terrific, but as soon as you bite into it you realize something is very
wrong.
Then you remember, "Oh yeah, in addition to the eggs and flour
and butter and cocoa, . . . I recall mixing in some axle grease from
my workshop in the garage. That's the only problem with the
cake-the axle grease! If I can just figure out a way to get the axle
grease out of the cake, it would be perfectly fine to eat ... ." The
fact of the matter is that in the vast majority of cases, the urges, the
desires, the character disorders that make them hurt and kill inno-
cent [people] are so deeply ingrained in the recipe of their makeup
that there is no way to get out the axle grease.343
According to many mental health experts, the ability to effectively
treat sex offenders like Hendricks is highly doubtful. One supporter
of Douglas's conclusion is Dr. Robert Wettstein, who argues that the
problematic nature of these treatment programs often leads to the
conclusion that these programs will essentially become indeterminate
treatment until after he filed suit. Id. The dissent vehemently argued that the majority should
not have gone beyond the record in deciding the case and pointed to the fact that it should have
been decided at the time suit was filed. Id. at 2093, 2096.
340. The dissent noted in its argument that Hendricks sat in the treatment facility for ten
months and still had not received any treatment. Id. at 2093.
341. Id.
342. JOHN DOUGLAS & MARK OLSHAKER, JOURNEY INTO DARKNESS 362 (1997).
343. Id.
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preventative detention, rather than therapeutic detention.344 While
supporters of civil commitment statutes argue that these offenders are
treatable, Wettstein maintains that effective treatment cannot and
does not occur after a lengthy prison sentence.345
He argues that because the treatment offered under these statutes
will be initiated years after the underlying offense, this delay "begins
to permit opportunities for significant distortions and defenses by the
offender. '346 He further argues that a passage of time causes memory
loss and poor recollection of the underlying offenses.347 Wettstein
then adds that the violent, threatening atmosphere of a correctional
facility socializes an offender into never showing weakness or vulnera-
bility and dissuades him from discussing his crimes, especially those
involving the rape and murders of children. 348 This socialization
works in direct opposition to the objectives of a treatment session,
where an offender is encouraged to discuss his crimes and his feelings
in relation those crimes.349
Wettstein's strongest argument involves the fact that most of these
offenders are the "end of the line" offenders who have been life-long
sexual predators who have already failed in previous treatment pro-
grams and who have persistently succeeded in denying their offenses
or responsibility for them.350 The first step toward any effective treat-
ment is a willing participant in the treatment program.35 1 Because all
commitments under these statutes are involuntary, the offender, at
least at the outset of this treatment, would not be a willing participant.
Then, if the offender never agrees to treatment, the civil commitment
will nonetheless turn into a permanent commitment. 352 Also, as
Douglas argues, if these offenders really cannot be considered "cured"
enough to be released into society, this indefinite civil commitment
will turn into a permanent commitment. 353 Permanent commitment,
344. Wettstein, supra note 260, at 614.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 617.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Wettstein, supra note 260, at 616.
351. See Marvin S. Swartz et al., The Ethical Challenges of a Randomized Controlled Trial of
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, 24 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 35, 36 (1997) (stating that
mental health professionals generally disapprove of forced treatment).
352. See DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, supra note 342, at 362. This problem has already material-
ized in state cases following the Hendricks case. See Montana v. Woods, 945 P.2d 918, 922
(Mont. 1997) (denying offender petition for release from hospital, partially because he had re-
fused treatment); State v. Zanelli, 569 N.W.2d 301, 310 (Wis. 1997) (denying petition for release
after civil commitment due to unsatisfactory progress in treatment).
353. DOUGLAS & OLSHAKER, supra note 342, at 362.
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instead of being an unfortunate by-product of these civil commitment
statutes, was probably the actual goal of the legislature when it
drafted the SVP Act.354
3. The Failure to Consider Less Restrictive Alternatives
The dissent in Hendricks raised the argument that the Court and
Kansas failed to consider less restrictive alternatives, noting that pre-
cedent holds that "failure to consider or to use, 'alternative and less
harsh methods' to achieve a non-punitive objective can help to show
that the legislature's 'purpose was to punish." 355 As revealed by its
research of seventeen states, the dissent in Hendricks found that only
seven of them delay treatment until after the offender has completed
his prison sentence.356 Six of those seven states, however, require
consideration of less restrictive alternatives to involuntary commit-
ment.357 Wisconsin requires the court to consider supervised release
of the defendant and specifically provides that "[t]he department shall
arrange for control, care, and treatment of the person in the least re-
strictive manner. ..358 Minnesota also requires consideration of vol-
untary outpatient care, voluntary admission to a treatment facility, or
appointment of a guardian or conservator.359 The California statute
requires the court to consider supervised release into the commu-
nity,360 and the Arizona statute provides that less restrictive alterna-
tives shall be considered. 361 Thus, Kansas departs significantly from
these statutory schemes by failing to consider less restrictive
alternatives.
Another alternative to civil commitment is to treat the offenders
while they serve their criminal sentence. The Kansas legislature noted
that treatment for these offenders was delayed because prison is a
354. See Hon. Tom Malone, The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act - Post Hendricks, 67 J.
KAN. B. Ass'N 36, 37 (1998) (noting several Kansas state legislators who advocated the statute as
a way to "keep dangerous sex offenders confined past their prison sentence" and that the state
could not continue to "let these animals back into our communities"). Thus, the importance of
providing adequate and prompt treatment for these offenders was not the reason for the stat-
ute's passage.
355. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2095 (1997) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
539 n.20 (1979)).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 980.06(2)(b) (West Supp. 1997).
359. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09 subd. 1 (West Supp. 1998).
360. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE ANN. § 6608(a) (West Supp. 1998).
361. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4606(B) (West Supp. 1997). New Jersey and Washington
also require consideration of less restrictive alternatives and impose similar requirements. N.J.
STAT. ANN. 30:4-27.11d (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.090 (West Supp. 1998).
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poor setting for treatment, 362 but that is arguably true only in tradi-
tional group therapy treatments. Physicians in the medical commu-
nity have been developing and advocating alternatives to the
unsuccessful cognitive therapies. 363 For example, Dr. Daniel Icenogle
argues for the biological treatments of male sex offenders.364 One ex-
ample is surgical treatment in the form of stereotaxic neurosurgery, in
which doctors are able to locate areas of the brain where large
amounts of sex hormones accumulate and destroy them.365 The result
has been described as a drastic change in the person's sexual behavior
and fantasies. 366
Another type of biological treatment is the use of hormone ther-
apy.367 This therapy, which is also known as chemical castration, is
most commonly performed with medroxyprogesterone acetate
("MPA").368 This hormone lowers serum testosterone, which is the
hormone directly responsible for sexual behavior and aggressive-
ness.369 In a study performed by Johns Hopkins Sexual Disorders
Clinic, the recidivism rate among a group of 600 offenders was less
than ten-percent. 370
362. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1996).
363. For discussion of this alternative treatment and its use in California, see Kay-Frances
Brody, A Constitutional Analysis of California's Chemical Castration Statute, 7 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTs. L. REV. 141 (1997) (arguing that chemicals have been found to be successful on certain
types of offenders but that the California statute may be facially unconstitutional); Mark J.
Neach, California is on the "Cutting Edge": Hormonal Therapy (a.k.a. "Chemical Castration") is
Mandated for Two-Time Child Molesters, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 351 (1997) (stating that the
therapy may be successful on certain types of sex offenders).
364. Daniel L. Icenogle, Sentencing Male Sex Offenders to the Use of Biological Treatments, 15
J. LEOAL MED. 279 (1994).
365. Id. at 282. These surgeries have proven to be promising, yet because of their highly
sensitive nature, they were limited to designated research centers, where physicians still do not
fully understand why the treatment is successful on some offenders. Id. at 282-83. Although it is
a successful treatment in some cases, it is still being refined. Id.
366. Id. at 283.
367. Id. at 284.
368. Id. The treatment usually consists of weekly injections and is often used in conjunction
with a form of talk therapy. Id. at 284-85. A minority of patients experienced side effects such
as weight gain, mild lethargy, cold sweats, hot flashes, shortness of breath, and lessened testes
size. Id. While not all the sex offenders responded to the treatment, of those who did respond to
the MPA, none had resumed their paraphilic behavior. Id. at 286. Additionally, while these
side effects may prevent mandated use of these drugs on sexual predators because of constitu-
tional concerns, these alternatives should be offered to the offender after all the side effects are
fully disclosed.
369. Id. at 283-84.
370. Icenogle, supra note 364, at 285 (citing Berlin & Malin, Media Distortion of the Public's
Perception of Recidivism and Psychiatric Rehabilitation, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1572, 1573
(1991)).
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Judicial acceptance of these treatment methods has been slow.
Many biological treatments may be considered a violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments if mandated;371 however, purely
voluntary participation in the biological treatment would not involve
the same concerns.372 Because they can be constitutional, these alter-
natives should be seriously considered as less restrictive alternatives in
civil commitment statutes. Had this type of treatment been offered to
Hendricks during the ten years he was in prison, he may have been
ready to return to society at the end of his prison sentence. Most of-
fenders would rather try hormone therapy than risk being indefinitely
civilly committed. 373 Furthermore, allowing sexual predators a choice
in treatment would likely increase their willingness to participate be-
cause they would feel like they have some control over what happens
and that they are not being forced to undergo treatment. The afore-
mentioned studies have consistently shown that willingness to partici-
pate facilitates treatment.374 This would more effectively advance the
alleged purpose of the SVP Act.375 Although the public disgust for
these types of offenders leads one to ask why the opinions of these
sexual predators should matter, it must be remembered that the pur-
ported purpose of the sexual predator statutes was to treat these of-
fenders, not to punish them. If studies have shown that treatment is
more effective when performed on willing participants, then these of-
fenders should be consulted about their treatment options.
Finally, many states already have statutes that allow for further im-
prisonment of sexual predators. As noted by the Supreme Court of
Kansas, the state could have had tripled Hendricks's sentence under
the Habitual Criminal Act or sentenced him with the maximum sen-
tence rather than the minimum sentence.376 These sentences also
371. See Brody, supra note 363, at 156-57 (arguing that the Court has long recognized a liberty
interest in being free from unwanted medical treatment). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute that provided for the sterilization of habitual
criminals who had been convicted three times of felonies involving crimes of moral turpitude).
372. Brody, supra note 363; Neach, supra note 363.
373. See generally Jeffrey A. Klotz, Sex Offenders and the Law: New Directions, in MENTAL
HEALTH AND LAW: RESEARCH, POLICY, AND SERVICES 257, 266-67 (1986) (advocating that in-
carcerated sex offenders should be encouraged to seek treatment in order to avoid civil commit-
ment after their sentences, thus giving them a choice in their treatment). Support for this
assertion exists in cases such as the one argued by Jeffrey Morse, a convicted child molester, who
recently succeeded in his fight to be surgically castrated. Janan Hanna, Admitted Molester Surgi-
cally Castrated, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1998, at 1. He stated that he did it for himself so that he
could finally get control of his life. Id. He said he hoped that the judge would consider his
willingness to treat himself when imposing sentence. Id.
374. See supra notes 363-70 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
376. In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 137 (Kan. 1996).
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could have run consecutively, thereby effectively imprisoning Hen-
dricks for the rest of his life.377 Instead, the prosecution chose to plea
bargain with Hendricks by dismissing one of his charges and recom-
mending only the minimum sentence instead of finding Hendricks a
habitual criminal under the Habitual Criminal Act.378 Had the prose-
cution properly utilized the options it had at its disposal, it would not
have had to resort to involuntary civil commitment in order to protect
society.
IV. IMPACT
A. Potential Abuse of Involuntary Civil Commitment Statutes
Because of the staggering impact of Hendricks, many issues are left
unanswered by the Court, and the debate over the constitutionality of
these statutes is far from finished. Currently, only seven states have
sexually violent predator laws, and in light of the Hendricks decision,
thirty other states are considering similar statutes.379
The most troubling issue in this case is the fact that these statutes
will undoubtedly be applied to other criminals. While the Hendricks
Court did not address the extension of involuntary civil commitment
schemes to other criminals, the Court upheld the statute partially be-
cause it was narrowly limited to a group of specific offenders, stating
that "this admitted lack of volitional control, coupled with prediction
of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from
other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with
exclusively through criminal proceedings. '380 The troubling fact re-
mains, however, that this same argument can be advanced in support
of the involuntary civil commitment of alcoholics or drug addicts.
First, drug addicts and alcoholics suffer from serious mental and physi-
cal cravings for the drug.38' These cravings can easily render them
unable to control their actions.382 Dangerousness, the second prong
of the test, can be satisfied if the state is able to show that the alco-
holic has driven while under the influence of alcohol or that the drug
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Tom Browell, Close to Home, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at C8; see also Matthew Purdy,
Wave of New Laws Seeks to Confine Sexual Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at 1 (noting
one legislature who "hurriedly passed its own version of the law" and that officials in several
other states are planning to do the same).
380. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (1997).
381. Steven E. Hyman, A Man with Alcoholism and HIV Infection, JAMA, Sept. 13, 1995, at
19-20.
382. Id.
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addict had ever stolen to support his or her habit.38 3 The state could
bring in an expert to testify about the nature of their physical cravings
for the drug and subsequently argue that the "likelihood of engaging
in repeat acts of ... [driving under the influence, robbery or burglary]
... are high. '384
While statutes providing for involuntary civil commitment of drug
addicts or alcoholics have not been introduced or passed by state leg-
islatures, SVP Acts like the one analyzed in Hendricks have already
been used to involuntarily civilly commit a once-convicted rapist.385
Naegele was classified as a sexual predator under Ohio law after his
conviction for one count of rape and one count of kidnapping.386
Naegele appealed, arguing that his history of one sexual crime was
insufficient evidence to classify him as a sexual predator.38 7 This rul-
ing was upheld at the appellate level; therefore, it may be inferred that
this form of involuntary commitment has already been extended to
include civil commitment of one-time sexual offenders. 388 A compari-
son of the crime committed by Naegele and the crimes committed by
Hendricks reveal a substantial difference in both the number of crimes
committed and the types of crimes committed. 38 9 Nonetheless, the
same statute originally intended to allow for the involuntary civil com-
mitment of predators like Hendricks has been expanded to allow such
commitment of any type of sexual offender.390 It may only be a mat-
383. The Hendricks Court noted that "commitment proceedings can be initiated only when a
person 'has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense .... '" Id. at 2080
(quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994)). This language could be altered to allow com-
mitment of alcoholics if the alcoholic has been convicted or charged with an alcohol-related
offense involving a motor vehicle or to commit drug addicts if the drug addict has been convicted
or charged with a drug-related offense.
384. This language is found in the Kansas SVP Act and was accepted by the Hendricks Court
as satisfying due process concerns. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01; Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2081.
This extension of civil commitment is highly likely in light of recent studies linking drugs and
crime. Elizabeth Shogren, Clinton Looks to End the Crime-Drug Link, TIMES UNION, Jan. 12,
1998, at A8; see Dan Janison, Treating Addicts In Jails: Additions Target Drug-Crime Link, NEWS-
DAY, Nov. 11, 1997, at A35 (reporting on prisons that are setting up addiction treatment pro-
grams for current prisoners and former inmates seeking continued treatment once freed).
385. State v. Naegele, No. CA97-04-043, 1998 LEXIS 1152, at *1 (Ohio App. 1998).
386. Id. at *5. The Ohio sexual predator statute defines a sexual predator as "a person who
has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and is likely to
engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2950.09(C)(1) (Anderson 1997).
387. Naegele, No. CA97-04-043, 1998 LEXIS 1152, at *1.
388. Id.
389. See supra notes 115-25 (tracing Hendricks's criminal history).
390. See supra notes 104-06 (tracing the passage of the Sexual Predator Act in Washington).
While it may be argued that expansion of the SVP Act to one-time sexual offenders, alcoholics,
or drug addicts may be socially desirable as well, the arguments were advanced to show that
these statutes are too broadly drafted and allow for extension beyond what the Hendricks Court
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ter of time before the Court will begin hearing cases where states
have extended civil commitment statutes to another type of criminal.
While the SVP Act purports to utilize non-punitive goals such as
treatment and the protection of society under its police powers, those
goals are overshadowed by the traditional criminal justice goals of in-
capacitation and rehabilitation.391 This is especially evident, consid-
ering the fact that Kansas initially had little concern for treatment. 392
The very purpose that has justified the civil commitment of Hendricks
remains highly debated in the mental and medical communities. 393
There is simply no conclusive proof that the current treatment meth-
ods employed are successful or effective.394 The purpose of civil com-
mitment may be jeopardized absent consideration of less restrictive
alternatives.395 Kansas concedes that treatment in a prison setting is
poor; therefore, an argument in favor of civil commitment is ex-
tremely weak and unconvincing when treatment is the purported goal,
but other possibilities have not been considered or attempted.
B. Proposed Legislation
This Note does not suggest that sexual predators should be allowed
to roam freely among society, especially if evidence indicates that they
are untreatable by current methods. Rather, this Note attempts to
bring the problems of the current sexual predator statutes to the at-
tention of legislators and to propose alternative methods of handling
sexual predators.
One possible scheme could proceed in a manner similar to the civil
commitment of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Under this scenario, if a state receives notice of crimes allegedly com-
mitted by a sexually violent predator, the state would be able to file a
petition of review of that individual's criminal record. If a judge de-
termines that probable cause exists to find that the individual is a sex-
ual pedophile, that person would undergo a court-ordered evaluation
by a state psychiatric professional. If that professional decides that
may have anticipated. Additionally, once involuntary civil commitment for drug addicts and
alcoholics begins, commitment for other types of criminals will most likely follow; hence, the
slippery slope begins.
391. See supra notes 213-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the facts that support
the argument that incapacitation was the true intent behind the SVP Act.
392. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of points raised by the
Hendricks dissent that show lack of concern for treatment.
393. See supra notes 342-54 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 342-54 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 355-78 and accompanying text (discussing the various alternatives avail-
able in the treatment of sexual pedophiles).
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the individual is a sexual pedophile, then he would be tried before a
jury to determine this beyond a reasonable doubt. If a jury returns
such a verdict, that predator will be committed indefinitely to a
mental institution. The prisoner would be subject to continued treat-
ment, including biological treatments if the predator so chooses, and
yearly periodic review of his progress. The prisoner would also be
able to petition on a regular basis for his release, and he would have
the burden of proving that he is fit to be released back into society.396
While this procedure sounds very similar to the one employed by
the state of Kansas in Hendricks, the critical difference is that this se-
quence occurs in lieu of a criminal trial. Thus, the constitutional
issues of double jeopardy and ex post facto are avoided. 397
An alternative proposal to keep these predators off the streets is to
impose life sentences without the possibility of parole. This proposal
is considerably cheaper for taxpayers than the civil commitment
scheme, and if it is proven that the treatment methods are not success-
ful enough to warrant continued use, this proposal would also be the
most logical.398 The prosecution had the means at its disposal to effec-
tively keep Hendricks behind bars for the rest of his life.399 Instead,
the state struck a plea bargain with Hendricks and returned ten years
later to involuntarily civilly commit him.400 While Kansas still as-
serted that its purpose in using the SVP Act was to provide treatment
for Hendricks, it is equally probable that the state merely realized its
mistake and then sought to remedy it. Imposing remedies to make up
for the shortcomings of the criminal justice system does not comport
with the understood principles of our system of government.40 1
396. Some may argue that this proposed scheme would be too costly for taxpayers. Under
schemes currently utilized by Kansas and most other states, the taxpayers first foot the bill for a
lengthy prison sentence, which normally costs taxpayers approximately seventy-three dollars per
day. Susan Carney, Sexual Predator Bill Draws No Public Support, Sponsor Plowman Disap-
pointed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 21, 1997, at 1. Then, after that prison sentence, the taxpay-
ers pay for treatment in the mental hospital. Id. Under this proposal, the taxpayer would pay
for only one period of confinement.
397. While some may argue that alternatives to statutes such as the SVP Act are unnecessary
because the Court has held them to be constitutional, the purpose of this Note was to demon-
strate that the decision is wrought with uncertainties and has opened the door to many problems
and abuses.
398. See Lally, supra note 1, at C4 (noting that hospitals cost typically four times as much as
traditional prison). See also Ardy Friedberg, Hospital Workers Fear Future Is Up For Bids,
Privatization Scheduled For Center For Mentally Ill, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 30, 1997, at 1B (noting
that the cost of care per person at the state mental hospital is $85,000 per year).
399. See supra notes 376-78 and accompanying text.
400. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (1997).
401. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy addressed this concern when he noted that civil com-
mitment should not be used to impose punishment after the state had made an "improvident
plea bargain on the criminal side." Id. at 2087. The fact that Hendricks had received a plea
[Vol. 48:113
KANSAS v. HENDRICKS
V. CONCLUSION
The debate surrounding the use of sexually violent predator statutes
is far from finished. The Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks was
highly anticipated and will undoubtedly be used as support for the
creation of sexual predator statutes in many other states. It appears
that this decision is a reflection of overwhelming public pressure on
the Court, akin to the public pressure exerted on the state of Washing-
ton.40 2 As this Note has illustrated, several constitutional infirmities
still remain; therefore, the Court's decision in Hendricks should not be
blindly relied upon by other states considering these statutes. Instead,
statutes should be created that allow either the criminal justice system
or the civil commitment system to be utilized, not both. Blind reliance
on the language used in the SVP Act will inevitably lead to indefinite
civil commitment of alcoholics or drug addicts after they serve jail
time.40 3 If society considers the crimes committed by alcoholics and
drug addicts as reprehensible as those of pedophiles and other sex
offenders, past experience indicates that statutes to civilly commit
them could be upheld.40 4
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bargain in this case did not concern Justice Kennedy because he believed that the SVP Act did
not constitute punishment. Id. Justice Kennedy did state that if mental abnormality is later
shown to be too imprecise a category to justify civil commitment, then he would not validate the
SVP Act. Id. As this Note has argued, mental abnormality is often regarded as being overly
vague and too broad. See supra notes 261-65 and accompanying text. This suggests that the
decision stands on unstable ground.
402. See supra notes 104-06 (describing the public outcry under which the Washington sexual
predator statute was passed).
403. See supra notes 380-90 (discussing the statutory variations that may lead to this type of
civil commitment).
404. See supra notes 104-06 for a discussion of the steps taken by protesters to ensure that the
state of Washington did something about pedophiles.
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